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Preface
The Corporate Governance Program
This report is part of the The Corporate Governance Program1 at the Norwegian
School of Management. This research program has two overall objectives. The
first is to construct a high-quality data base on a wide set of corporate gover-
nance characteristics for Norwegian firms. The second objective is to empirically
explore the determinants of a firm’s corporate governance characteristics and the
relationship between such governance characteristics and the firm’s behavior as an
economic entity. The Corporate Governance Program, which consists of a series
of individual projects, is sponsored by the Norwegian School of Management and
the Research Council of Norway.
The issues analyzed in this report
Existing evidence shows that concentrated ownership (i.e., investors with large
equity stakes) per se destroys value in most Norwegian listed firms. However, if
the large owners enter the board or the management team, the expected value
creation is considerable. To illustrate, Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001b) estimate
that the market value of the assets for the average firm increases by 1% (NOK
20 mill.) when the equity fraction of board members increases by one percentage
unit. In such a perspective, the objective of this report is to empirically explore
how the structure of the board relate to the firm’s value creation process.
We examine how firm behavior relates to a wide range of externally observable
board characteristics, such as the directors’ equity stakes in the firm, the board’s
independence of the CEO, board size, directors’ tenure, directorships held in other
1http://finance.bi.no/~governance
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firms (network), director age heterogeneity, and gender mix. We also include
control variables such as other governance mechanisms, industry type, and firm
size. This project contributes to the understanding of boards in several ways.
First, it is among the very few studies to include board independence, director
network, employee directors, and gender as joint determinants of board behavior.
Second, the richness of the data set allows for a test design which captures both the
interactions between many different characteristics, their behavior over time, and
a possible reverse causation between board characteristics and firm performance.
Third, whereas almost all existing studies are from the US, our European setting
reflects a quite different institutional environment. Therefore, compared to earlier
research on this issue (see Bhagat and Black (1999) and Hermalin and Weisbach
(2003) for surveys), our study is more comprehensive and quite different.
The innovative features of our study stem primarily from the analysis of board
independence, director networks, and board heterogeneity. For example, the stan-
dard measure of board independence is the fraction of directors who are not em-
ployed by, or otherwise affiliated with, the firm (Byrd and Hickman, 1992). How-
ever, this anglo-saxon inside/outside director dimension is irrelevant for Norway,
where there is never more than one officer on the board (the CEO). In addi-
tion, the empirical success of the outside/inside variable in extant studies is quite
mixed. We try to overcome these problems by constructing a measure for board
independence which reflect the tenure of the person to be monitored (the CEO)
relative to the tenure of the monitors (the directors). This proxy is is the average
number of years since the board members were elected minus the number of years
since the CEO was appointed. The larger the difference, the higher the board’s
independence of the CEO.
Earlier research has analyzed the effect on CEO compensation of interlocking
boards, i.e., officers who sit on several boards in general and on each others’ boards
in particular (Hallock, 1997). However, if one thinks of interlocking boards as a sign
of either value–creating networking or value–destroying director overload, multiple
directorships has potentially a broader impact on performance than through CEO
compensation alone. Since we know the identity of every director and every CEO
in every sample firm, we can establish such network and overload proxies and
explore their role in value creation.
The relationship between gender and board behavior has hardly been analyzed
empirically. Moreover, political moves are currently made to ensure by law that
larger Norwegian firms assign women to at least 40% of the board seats. Both
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factors make it particularly interesting to include gender on top of age dispersion
and the use of employee directors in a study of board diversity.
Our findings
Using a sample of all non-financial listed Norwegian firms over the period 1989-
2002, we explore empirically how board composition influences the conflict of in-
terest between agents and principals, the production of information for monitoring
and support, and the board’s effectiveness as a decision-maker. We find that poten-
tial agency costs are high because the typical firm’s ownership structure produces
low incentives to monitor the management team. Boards are small, gender diver-
sity is low, less than half the firms have employee directors, and most CEOs are
neither directors in their firm nor elsewhere. Using a wide set of such board design
mechanisms and new measures of board independence and director networking,
static fixed effects panel data models show that value-creating boards are aligned
with the shareholders and dependent on the CEO. Multiple directorships create
valuable information networks, but diversity in terms of gender, board size, and
employee directors reduces the board’s decisiveness. Dynamic panel data mod-
els accounting for endogeneity between the board design mechanisms and reverse
causation between the mechanisms and performance support these findings.
These results suggest that designers of value-creating boards should encourage
insider stock ownership, ensure the CEO is a board member even if it reduces
independence, hire directors with professional business competence rather than
arms-length monitoring capacity, recognize the network value of directors with
multiple seats rather than worry about potential overstretching, and construct
boards that are homogeneous rather than diverse.
Some of these conclusions are politically incorrect, run counter to recent rec-
ommendations in corporate governance codes, and pull board design into opposite
directions than those implied by conventional wisdom. We think this reflects a
situation where practical board design has been shaped by practitioners and reg-
ulators based on their limited personal experience, political agendas, and recently
also by their concern with scandal prevention rather than firm value maximiza-
tion. Our findings support the claim that much more academic research is needed
in order to ensure a well-founded economic rationale for the regulation of board
design.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
How should regulators and shareholders design the board of directors in a way
that fosters value creation? According to theory and existing evidence, the three
major concerns in board design are to align the interests of principals and agents
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), provide information for the board’s monitoring and
support functions (Fama, 1980), and to enhance its decisiveness, i.e., the decision-
making efficiency (Fama and Jensen, 1983). This report addresses this question
empirically by analyzing how firm performance relates to a wide set of board design
mechanisms, such as director equity ownership in the firm, board independence,
director network, age and gender heterogeneity within the board, board size, and
the use of employee directors.
Earlier research has focused on just one or a few of these mechanisms, such
as insider ownership (Mørck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990), board
independence (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Hermalin andWeisbach, 1991), director
networks (Mizruchi and Stearns, 1988; Hallock, 1997), and board size (Yermack,
1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998). However, boards have multiple tasks, such as hiring
and firing the CEO, monitoring the firm’s investment and financing projects, and
setting the corporate strategy. This multidimensional task may not be successfully
solved with just one board mechanism, such as insider ownership alone or the
director network alone. Moreover, since board mechanisms may be internally
related, the value-creation effect of any one of them cannot be validly analyzed
without simultaneously accounting for the others. For instance, if monitoring
by the owners is a substitute for the CEO’s incentive to maximize firm value,
information for monitoring purposes may be more valuable the smaller the CEO’s
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equity stake in the firm (Rediker and Seth, 1995; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996).
We use an empirical approach which explicitly recognizes this multidimensional
nature of board design. This is our first contribution to the research on value-
creating boards.
Our second contribution is to introduce new empirical proxies for board in-
dependence and director network. Important parts of the board literature (Byrd
and Hickman, 1992; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991) and most national corporate
governance codes (www.ecgi.org/codes) classify directors as dependent if they
are affiliated, i.e., if they have past or present business or family relations to the
firm. A possible reason why this measure has produced inconclusive evidence on
the relationship between board independence and firm performance is that the
proxy is theoretically ad–hoc. According to Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), which
is the first rigidly developed theoretical model in this field, what matters for direc-
tor independence is not affiliation. Rather, the key is the relative timing of entry,
i.e., whether the director was appointed before or after the current CEO took of-
fice. Our new independence proxy reflects this characteristic. Similarly, existing
literature measures director network simply by the number of board seats held in
other firms (Shivdasani, 1993; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). In contrast, our network
proxy tries to pick up the separate insight gained from each individual seat by
estimating its unique information centrality in the overall corporate landscape.
The richness of the data set and special features of the institutional setting
drive our third contribution. We observe every non-financial firm listed on the Oslo
Stock Exchange (OSE) from 1989 to 2002. This time series, which is unusually
long by international standards, allows us to study board dynamics over extensive
periods. For example, Bhagat and Black (2002) classify board independence in
their sample firms based on one single year, while performance is measured six
years before and four years after. Also, our ownership structure data are unusually
detailed, accounting for every equity holding of every owner in every firm at every
year-end over fourteen years.
Our sample firms are exposed to two board design regulations which are uncom-
mon internationally. Norwegian corporate law rules that the CEO cannot be the
chairman. Although not by law, it is also an empirical fact that other members of
the management team are never directors in their firm, and the CEO is not on the
board in roughly two thirds of the cases. Thus, in contrast to the US, regulation
and a voluntary restriction on board composition jointly reduce the tendency to
use the firm’s officers as the firm’s directors. The second unusual regulation is that
3when a listed firm employs more than 200 people, the employees have the right to
elect one third of the directors. Since roughly 40% our sample firms have employee
directors, the cross-sectional variation of this board design mechanism allows us
to analyze the performance effect of employee directors, which is quite unexplored
in the literature (Becht et al., 2002).
As our sample includes repeated observations of the same firm over time, we use
panel data methods to separate the performance impact due to the firm only from
that of general factors influencing every firm. The unobserved firm heterogeneity
is controlled for in a fixed effects model, using the generalized least squares (GLS)
and the general method of moments (GMM) as estimation methods. GMM panel
data methods also allow us to analyze potential board mechanism endogeneity
and reverse causation between mechanisms and performance (Hermalin and Weis-
bach, 2003) in a novel way. Mechanism endogeneity occurs when one board design
mechanism is determined by other design mechanisms, whereas reverse causation
happens when performance drives board composition and not just the other way
around. Because the underlying structural relationship between the variables is
unknown, this setting is intractable with the simultaneous equations methodology,
which has been used earlier in similar settings (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). In
particular, because the instruments have no proper theoretical rationale, the find-
ings from such models may be misleading. In contrast, we estimate each equation
separately, using a wide set of instruments constructed from conditional moments
of the data’s panel structure. Additionally, reverse causation is further analyzed
in dynamic versions of the models.
Our findings show that potential agency costs in our sample firms are high, as
both outside and inside ownership concentration is low. Also, these two mecha-
nisms for aligning the interests of owners and managers are complements rather
than substitutes. The board’s average independence is medium in the Hermalin
and Weisbach (1998) sense, as the CEO and the average director are appointed
at roughly the same point in time. The CEO is a director in the firm he manages
in approximately one third of the cases, and those who are also sit more often on
other boards. Our information centrality measure shows that boards differ sub-
stantially in how their directors’ outside board memberships generate access to
valuable information from other boards.
As for board heterogeneity, most boards are unusually small and gender di-
versity is low. In contrast, large director age differences and the use of employee
directors both contribute to high diversity. Average director age per board varies
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by almost fifty years across the sample, and less than half the firms have employee
directors. Over time, the CEO is gradually less often a director, female directors
become considerably more common, and the use of employee directors is declining.
Our regression models show that value creation is significantly higher when
ownership concentration is high, directors are dependent of the CEO, the CEO
is a director on his own board but not elsewhere, outside CEOs are absent, non-
CEO directors hold outside directorships, boards are small, gender diversity is
low, age diversity is high, and when the board has no employee directors. These
results are robust to alternative specifications of the panel data models and to
different operationalizations of the theoretical variables. They are not invalidated
by mechanism endogeneity and reverse causation. The results are both different
and less reliable when we ignore the panel data structure and use OLS regressions
on the pooled sample.
These findings suggest that value-creating boards have directors who are depen-
dent on the CEO. Moreover, multiple directorships seem to produce information
networks whose value more than offsets the potential cost of having overstretched
directors. Increased diversity in terms of more female directors, larger board size,
and more employee directors are value-reducing board design mechanisms, prob-
ably because they reduce the board’s effectiveness as a decision-maker. These
results run counter to conventional wisdom and most corporate governance codes,
but are reasonably consistent with theoretical arguments and the limited empirical
evidence from other studies.
The rest of the report is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature
and explains where our methodology deviates from that used by others. Section
3 describes the institutional framework, explains the data selection procedure,
and presents the descriptive statistics. We formally test the relationship between
board design mechanisms and economic performance in chapter 4, whereas chapter
5 provides robustness checks. Chapter 6 summarizes and concludes.
Chapter 2
Theory, evidence, and
methodology
In their recent survey of corporate governance research, Becht et al. (2002) con-
clude that the theory of board design is grossly underdeveloped: ”. . . formal analy-
sis of the role of boards of directors and how they should be regulated is almost
non-existent. . . . In sum, the formal literature on boards is surprisingly thin given
the importance of the board of directors in policy debates. This literature mainly
highlights the complexity of the issues. There is also surprisingly little common
ground between the models.”
These characteristics of a young, immature paradigm produce challenges for
empirical research. Although the board design problem is multidimensional by
nature, each existing theory is partial and addresses one or a few board design
mechanisms. This means we cannot use theory to predict what the full set of
value-creating board mechanisms looks like in equilibrium. Neither can we specify
the expected internal relationship between key mechanisms. For instance, theories
of interest alignment (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) ignore potential links to deci-
siveness (Gjølberg and Nordhaug, 1996) and vice versa. Consequently, we cannot
validly predict whether insider equity holdings and board size are substitute, com-
plementary or independent mechanisms. The only feasible way to go is to specify
expected performance effects of each individual mechanism from each partial the-
ory. Therefore, we regard the estimated relationship between the mechanisms and
how they jointly drive performance as observed empirical regularities rather than
tests of well-founded hypotheses.
5
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In the following, we motivate our focus and methodology by reviewing the ex-
isting literature. We organize the discussion around the three major concerns un-
derlying the choice of any specific board design mechanism, which are to align the
interests of principals and agents (section 2.1), provide information for monitoring
and support (section 2.2), and to enhance the board’s efficiency as a decision-maker
(section 2.3).
2.1 Interest alignment
Interest alignment in a board context concerns the firm’s ownership structure and
the degree of independence between the monitoring directors and the monitored
officers.
The theory of corporate governance argues that outside and inside ownership
concentration matter for interest alignment because they influence the principal’s
incentives and power to monitor the agent (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Mørck
et al., 1988). Both effects are stronger the higher the ownership concentration,
and inside ownership concentration (equity holdings by officers and directors) is
more powerful than outside because inside owners are better informed and have
direct access to the firm’s decision-making process. However, because powerful
insiders may entrench themselves and exploit their outside co-owners, the expected
relationship between inside ownership concentration and market value is positive
in the beginning and declining thereafter.
The empirical evidence on the relationship between outside concentration and
firm performance is mixed and inconclusive (Gugler, 2001). The prediction on in-
side concentration, which is what matters for board design, has received consistent
support by studies that ignore other board design mechanisms than insider owner-
ship (Mørck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Gugler, 2001). In contrast,
the board literature reports mixed results for the alignment effect of insider owner-
ship, both when proxying by the aggregate equity held by the firm’s directors and
by the CEO’s holdings alone. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991); Byrd and Hickman
(1992); Yermack (1996); Cotter et al. (1997) and Bhagat and Black (2002) all find
a positive relationship, but it is only significant in Hermalin and Weisbach (1991)
and Yermack (1996). Thus, adding more mechanisms to a board design model
than just ownership structure may easily blur the mostly clean empirical relation-
ship between insider ownership and firm performance found in simpler models.
Our comprehensive model allows us to study this issue more closely.
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We measure outside ownership concentration by the Herfindahl index based on
all outside owners.1 Insider ownership is proxied for by the directors’ aggregate
equity holdings in the firm.
The board literature and existing corporate governance codes argue that moni-
toring quality is higher the stronger the independence between the firm’s directors
and the management team. Such independence generally reflects the directors’
ability to closely monitor the firm without being biased by pressure from the
CEO. Arguing that this involves more than just the distinction between outside
and inside directors, Byrd and Hickman (1992) introduce a finer partition by dis-
tinguishing between inside, affiliated outside, and independent outside directors.
Only the latter type has no past or present business or family ties to the firm.
The empirical evidence on the relationship between such independence mea-
sures and firm performance is inconclusive. Baysinger and Butler (1985) found a
ten-year lagged positive effect, but such a lag seems unrealistically long. Hermalin
and Weisbach (1991) found no significant link, while Yermack (1996), Agrawal
and Knoeber (1996), Klein (1998), Bhagat and Black (1999), and Bhagat and
Black (2002) all find a negative, significant relationship. After having surveyed
the evidence, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) conclude that the empirical litera-
ture cannot justify a positive relationship between board independence and firm
performance.
One possible reason for the low consistency between these studies is the miss-
ing theoretical justification for their affiliation-based independence measure. A
quite different definition of independence is implied by the Hermalin and Weisbach
(1998) model. Here, board independence is driven by firm performance, and the
CEO’s ability to recruit dependent directors is better the stronger the firm’s past
performance. The model predicts that the longer the history of good performance
under the current CEO, the less independent the current directors. Thus, the key
independence criterion is not affiliation, but whether the director was appointed
before or after the CEO took office.
The second reason to drop the conventional independence definition is our
institutional framework. The CEO of our sample firms is also a director in just
one third of the cases. Also, he cannot be the chairman by law, and other members
of the management team are never on the board. This means that although most
1The Herfindahl index for outside ownership concentration is the sum of squared ownership
fractions across all the firm’s outside owners. Its maximum value is one (a single investor owns
every share held by the outsiders), approaching its minimum value of zero as the ownership
structure gets increasingly diffuse.
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directors in our sample are independent in the Byrd-Hickman sense, they may be
dependent according to the Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) criterion.
This idea is not new. CEO tenure has been used as an independence proxy in
the strategic management literature (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989). Although
not based on an underlying theoretical model, Westphal and Fredrickson (2001)
did in fact use the fraction of directors appointed after the CEO took office as one
of several measures of board independence. Thus, consistent with the Hermalin-
Weisbach model and following the Westphal and Fredrickson (2001) logic, we mea-
sure a board’s independence as the difference between the average tenure of the
non-CEO directors and the tenure of the CEO:
Independence ≡
1
n
m∑
i=1
non-CEO director tenurei − CEO Tenure (2.1)
where non-CEO director tenurei is the number of years since non-CEO director
i took office, and m is the number of directors elected by shareholders. The
average director has longer (shorter) tenure than the CEO when expression (2.1)
is positive (negative). According to Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), the board is
more independent the higher the value of (2.1).
Unlike Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), Carter and Lorsch (2004) argue that
board independence is driven by the director’s absolute rather than relative tenure,
and that independence decreases rather than increases as tenure grows. This
happens because directors become emotionally more attached to the firm and its
management the longer they stay.2 Under this logic, a higher value of (2.1) means
less independence rather than more. However, since (2.1) also reflects the tenure
of the CEO, which is irrelevant under the Carter-Lorsch hypothesis, we also use
board tenure, CEO tenure, and chair tenure as separate proxies in the robustness
tests of section 5.
2.2 Information provision
The quality of the board’s monitoring and support functions depends on the quality
of the directors’ information used. Internal information sources influenced by
2”Long service helps a director to understand the company better, but emotional attachment
means she can’t be truly independent. She identifies with the company, its management, and
her fellow directors. She is certainly aligned with management, with the broader interests of the
company, and its success, but may find it difficult to be truly independent in deciding what’s in
the shareholders’ best interests.” (Carter and Lorsch, 2004, p. 49).
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board design are CEO directorship and employee directors. External sources are
the CEO’s directorships in other firms (which we call exported CEO director),
another firm’s CEO on our firm’s board (imported CEO director), and non-CEO
directors holding board seats in other firms (director network).
Agency theory suggests the CEO should not be on a board which is supposed
to monitor him. In contrast, Carter and Lorsch (2004) posit that since the CEO
has superior information about the firm and its environment, he should be a fully
voting member. As this happens in about every third of our sample firms, we
can explore the validity of these competing predictions. While the CEO-chairman
duality has been studied in many papers, the use/non-use of a CEO director has
not been analyzed in the literature so far.3
Similarly, whereas the agency logic suggests that the CEO should pay full
attention to his firm, the information perspective would argue that the firm may
benefit from the information gained when the CEO is on other firms’ boards. We
use the exported CEO director variable to capture this design characteristic. Perry
and Peyer (2005) show that in firms with high agency costs, the announcement
of a new outside directorship for the CEO causes a negative share price reaction.
Correspondingly, a CEO from another firm on our board (imported CEO director)
may contribute little if he is already overstretched as a busy CEO. Also, Gilson and
Kraakman (1991) argue that imported CEO directors are bad monitors because
they have the same role in the principal-agent setting as the CEO they are supposed
to monitor. Again, the counterargument is the information idea that the imported
CEO director brings new perspectives and makes all directors better informed.
The net impact of these alignment and information effects can only be determined
empirically.
Just like the CEO, non-CEO directors with multiple directorships may bring
back information, but may also become uncommitted and overstretched monitors
(Ferris et al., 2003). Fama (1980) argues that the average number of outside di-
rectorships held by the firm’s directors proxies for the market value of the board’s
monitoring quality. This measure, which is predominant in finance-based board
research and used in papers such as Byrd and Hickman (1992), Cotter et al. (1997),
Shivdasani (1993), and Perry and Peyer (2005), is simple, but problematic. Al-
though the information benefit may be positively related to the number of direc-
torships, the measure is noisy because it ignores the uniqueness of each seat. For
3Because both alignment and information issues are involved, the CEO director mechanism
may be classified under either the alignment or the information heading. Although we choose
the latter, there is no implicit assumption about relative importance.
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the same reason, the proxy does not distinguish between n director links to one
other firm and one link per firm to n different firms. Finally, it only captures
direct links, neglecting the indirect links created when a director from our firm is
on another firm’s board with someone who holds a seat in still another firm.
In order to avoid these problems, we apply the information centrality concept
from social network analysis, which is based on graph theory (Wasserman and
Faust, 1994).4 The information centrality measure captures the firm’s direct and
indirect links to other firms that are established when our firm’s directors meet
other firms’ directors. It treats each seat individually, and it does not double
count. The centrality score increases with the number of direct and indirect paths
from our firm to other firms, and it is higher the shorter the path.5 The higher
the centrality score, the stronger the information effect of the directors’ network.
We will illustrate the the information centrality measure in chapter 3.
2.3 Decisiveness
Given the board design mechanisms used to align conflicting interests (section 2.1)
and generate information (section 2.2), the third set of mechanisms is supposed
to improve the board’s effectiveness as a decision-making unit. The mechanisms
we explore are board size, director gender, director age, and the use of employee
directors.
4The use of multiple directorships in social network analysis has a long tradition in sociology
and strategy (Pfeffer, 1972; Dalton et al., 1998, 1999; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003).
5Network theory employs concepts such as nodes and lines. In our setting, a node is a firm,
and a line between two firms represents a joint director in the two firms. We define geodesic
gjk as the shortest path between two nodes j and k, and G as the total number of nodes. The
node (here: firm) i is designated as ni. Using Wasserman and Faust (1994, p. 192-197), the
Information centrality measure is constructed in the following way: Form the G × G matrix
A with diagonal elements aii = (1 + sum of values for all lines incident to ni) and off-diagonal
elements aij , where
aij =
(
0 if nodes ni and nj are not adjacent
1− xij if nodes ni and nj are adjacent
xij is the value of the tie from firm ni to firm nj , that is, 0 or 1. The inverse of A,C = A
−1, has
elements {cij}, where we define T =
PG
i=1 cii and R =
PG
j=1 cij . The information centrality
index for firm ni is:
Ci (ni) =
1
cii + (T − 2R)/G
The index measures the information content in the paths that originate and end at a specific
firm.
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Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) show empirically that performance
decreases with increasing board size. This finding is consistent with the theoretical
model of Gjølberg and Nordhaug (1996), who show that increased board size is
potentially valuable only if new members bring new insights and new information.
This is because larger boards take longer time to decide and make more conven-
tional decisions than smaller boards. Thus, performance suffers in their model
because increased board size means less creativity and less decisiveness.
Increased board size may also produce more diversity, which according to Cad-
bury (2002) is a valuable board characteristic. Public choice theory (Buchanan
and Tullock, 1962; Mueller, 2003) suggests there is a tradeoff here, as the negative
effect of longer decision time and stronger pressure on consensus may be offset
by the positive impact of a wider opportunity set.6 Thus, the issue is not just
whether board size grows per se, but whether it does with new directors who differ
sufficiently from the existing ones. Gender and age are potential ways to create
such diversity.
The empirical evidence on how performance correlates with gender and age is
scant and conflicting. Welbourne (1999) finds that the higher the fraction of women
in the management team, the higher the firm’s short- and long–term performance
after the IPO. Shrader et al. (1997) document a negative relationship between
female directors and firm performance, whereas Carter et al. (2003) and Smith
et al. (2005) find the opposite. As far as we know, age has not been studied in
this setting. We will use the fraction of female directors and the variance of the
directors’ age to proxy for gender diversity and age diversity, respectively.
The presence of employee directors is potentially a mechanism for both align-
ment, information, and decisiveness. Because employees are stakeholders (Free-
man and Reed, 1983) with contractual claims on the firm’s cash flow, the hold-up
problem suggests that shared control with employees who invest in firm-specific
human capital may benefit owners (Becht et al., 2002). However, Williamson
(1996) argues that since employees have a contractual claim, they should not have
a residual claim as well. Because employees will defend their sunk human capital
investments, they may oppose restructurings which threaten their position. This
is the alignment dimension of employee directorships.
6In the public choice literature, committee size determines the decision time costs and the so
called external costs. Increased committee size increases decision time costs and reduces external
costs, which are costs that the committee imposes on others. In a board setting, proponents of
large boards argue that such external costs can be reduced by increased board size, for instance,
by including stakeholders such as lenders and employees.
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Noe and Rebello (1997) and Raheja (2005) argue that outside directors are
better monitors when firm-internal information comes through several channels
and not only from the CEO. Thus, employee directors supplement the CEO as a
firm-internal information source.
Decisiveness is the third dimension of employee directorships. Because of the
potential conflict of interest between owners and employees, decision complexity
will increase and the board will be a less effective decision maker according to
the Gjølberg and Nordhaug (1996) logic. This is the major reason why Cadbury
(2002) thinks boards should be unitary.
FitzRoy and Kraft (1993) and Schmid and Seger (1998) show that employee
directors have a negative effect on owners’ wealth in German firms. Similarly,
recent evidence from Canada shows that the overall effect of employee directors is
negative from the owners’ point of view. In particular, Falaye et al. (2004) find that
firms where employees hold director positions due to their large shareholdings in
their company spend less on new assets, take fewer risks, grow more slowly, create
less new jobs, deviate more from value maximization, have more serious cash flow
problems, and are less productive.
Employees in Norwegian firms with more than 200 people have the right to
elect one third of the directors. Because many listed firms are either smaller or
exempted from this rule, only 41% of our sample firms have employee directors.
We measure employee participation by the fraction of the firm’s directors employed
by the firm.
2.4 Reverse causation and endogeneity
By reverse causation we mean that the firm’s performance drives its board design
mechanisms. This happens in the Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) model, where
the board becomes less independent the better the firm performs. Raheja (2005)
recently extended this logic to board size, arguing that the reverse causation is
driven by the independent directors’ need to evaluate the information provided
by the CEO. With an increased demand for balanced information after a period
of declining performance, the board is enlarged with inside directors, who pro-
vide a new source of firm-internal information. In contrast Palia (2001) posits
that insider ownership increases when performance improves, as options and other
equity-related compensation instruments are more often exercised when firms do
well.
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We use the term endogeneity to characterize the situation where the board
design mechanisms are internally related, driven by a set of exogenous variables.
An early example in corporate governance research is Demsetz and Lehn (1985),
who argue that when value-maximizing owners can freely choose their firm’s gov-
ernance mechanisms, equilibrium occurs when each mechanism’s marginal perfor-
mance impact is identical across all mechanisms. This implies that the governance
mechanisms are internally related, being either substitutes or complements in a
valuation sense. The optimal set of governance mechanisms depends upon exoge-
nous factors which are not driven by the firm’s governance mechanisms, such as
the firm’s industry, its operational risk, and the stage of the business cycle. This
is also the logic followed by Raheja (2005) when relating governance mechanisms
to governance-exogenous characteristics.
Thus, the Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) model predicts that increased (de-
creased) performance decreases (increases) independence, while the Raheja (2005)
model predicts the opposite, positive relationship. In addition, the Raheja (2005)
model implies that this reverse causation between performance and independence
also produces mechanism endogeneity between size and independence. The two
will be negatively related, as large boards are less independent than small boards.
We explore reverse causation and endogeneity by focusing on the directors’
equity ownership, board independence, and board size. We also include the infor-
mation network variable because it turns out to be an important driver of perfor-
mance. Since the exact theoretical relationships between the variables is unknown
, we do not construct a system of simultaneous equations. Instead, we argue in
section 4.3 that this situation is better analyzed with single-equation estimation
and GMM.
Chapter 3
Descriptive statistics
3.1 Institutional setting and sample selection
The Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) had an aggregate market capitalization of 68
bill. USD equivalents by year-end 2002, ranking the OSE sixteenth among the
twenty–two European stock exchanges for which comparable data is available.
During our sample period from 1989 to 2002, the number of firms listed increased
from 129 to 203, market capitalization grew by 8% per annum, and market liquid-
ity, measured as transaction value over market value, increased from 52% in 1989
to 72% in 2002.1
Norwegian firms have a less concentrated ownership structure than any other
European country except the UK. For example, the average largest owner holds
close to 50% of voting equity in a continental-European listed firm, 30% in Norway,
and 15% in the UK. The corresponding US figure is 3% (Barca and Becht, 2001;
Bøhren and Ødegaard, 2001a). Norway has a civil law regime, which is gener-
ally considered less investor–protective than common law. Nevertheless, La Porta
et al. (2000) find that Norway’s regulatory environment provides better protection
of shareholder rights than the average common law country. According to their
theory of institutionally determined ownership structures, the strong investor pro-
tection is a major reason why Norway’s ownership concentration is so low.
A Norwegian firm may and may not have a two-tiered board. The major
function of the supervisory board is to elect the members of the regular board
and rubber–stamp its decisions. Firms with more than 200 employees must have a
1Sources: http://www.ose.no and http://www.fibv.com.
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supervisory board, although a majority vote among the employees may replace the
supervisory board by an extra employee director seat in the regular board. If both
owners and employees agree, also smaller firms can choose to have a supervisory
board. Moreover, firms in the newspaper, shipping, petroleum extraction, and
financial industries are exempted from the supervisory board system. However,
some of these may have negotiated solutions with their local union.
The law on employee directors was passed in 1973 and was written into the con-
stitution seven years later (Aarbakke et al., 1999). If the firm employs more than
200 people, one third of the directors must be elected by and from the employees.
In firms employing less than 201, labor representation presupposes majority vote
among the employees. They may elect up to one third and at least two directors if
the firm employs between 51 and 200. Labor may also elect one director in firms
with more than 30 and less than 51 employees. Overall, this system implies that
many firms have no labor representation on the board. Among the firms that do,
the fraction of employee directors will vary considerably.
Our sample is all non-financial firms listed on the OSE at year-end at least
once over the period 1989 to 2002. To reduce censoring bias in the tenure mea-
sures, we start collecting board data in 1986. Ownership structure data, which
covers every equity holding by every investor in every sample firm at year-end, was
provided by the public securities register (Verdipapirsentralen). Accounting and
share price data is from the OSE’s data provider (Oslo Børs Informasjon), and
board data was collected manually from Kierulf ’s H˚andbok and a public electronic
register (Brønnøysundregistrene). Since 1988, every sample firm must report every
director’s name, birth date and board position to this register.2
Table 3.1, which is organized according to the three major concerns in board
design (interest alignment, information provision, and decisiveness), summarizes
key properties of the frequency distributions for each board design mechanism.
Table A.1 in the appendix defines the variables used. We will use table 3.1 as a
point of reference throughout this section. We start out with summary statistics
for a specific board mechanism in table 3.1, continue to a new table which provides
more details, and then return to table 3.1 to consider a new mechanism.
2We faced two problems with the board data. First, the two data sources did not always
match. When in doubt, Kierulfs H˚andbok was used for 1986–1992, and the electronic register
thereafter. This is because the electronic register lacked some precision in the first period.
Second, because employee directorships were not always properly recorded in either Kierulfs
H˚andbok or Brønnøysundregistrene, we checked both when the two deviated. When information
was incomplete in a given year, we compared the information on the firm’s employee directors
in the preceding and the subsequent year.
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Table 3.1 Summary statistics for board design mechanisms in all non-financial
firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange 1989-2002
Variable Mean Stdev Median Min Max N
Alignment
Insider ownership 0.074 0.194 0.001 0.000 1.000 1688
Directors’ holdings 0.064 0.190 0.000 0.000 1.000 1861
CEO holdings 0.036 0.140 0.000 0.000 1.000 1865
Herfindahl index 0.176 0.201 0.111 0.003 1.000 1784
Three largest owners 0.498 0.220 0.478 0.047 1.000 1735
Largest outside owner 0.293 0.233 0.220 0.000 1.000 1718
Independence -0.301 2.110 0.000 -12.857 10.333 2205
Board tenure 1.886 1.695 1.500 0.000 11.333 2204
CEO tenure 2.161 2.445 1.000 0.000 16.000 2205
Chair tenure 1.874 2.321 1.000 0.000 16.000 2205
Information
CEO director dummy 0.296 0.457 0.000 0.000 1.000 2207
Exported CEO 0.348 0.747 0.000 0.000 6.000 2207
Imported CEO 0.281 0.538 0.000 0.000 4.000 2207
Outside directorships 0.536 0.547 0.400 0.000 4.333 2207
Network 0.184 0.077 0.203 0.069 0.320 2207
Decisiveness
Size 6.024 1.961 6.000 2.000 15.000 2207
Size1 5.087 1.330 5.000 2.000 15.000 2207
Gender 0.047 0.097 0.000 0.000 0.556 2207
Gender1 0.025 0.079 0.000 0.000 0.500 1273
Gender2 0.078 0.110 0.000 0.000 0.556 934
Gender3 0.034 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.667 2207
Gender4 0.150 0.270 0.000 0.000 1.000 934
CEO age 47.033 7.701 47.000 24.000 72.000 2192
Board age 50.186 5.514 50.333 27.200 73.500 2207
Board age dispersion 8.004 3.163 7.789 0.000 21.920 2207
Employee directors 0.938 1.206 0.000 0.000 4.000 2207
Fraction employee directors 0.128 0.158 0.000 0.000 0.500 2207
Controls
Firm size 13.313 2.029 13.074 5.366 23.006 1635
Risk 0.772 0.657 0.709 -0.994 8.127 1733
Performance
Q 1.482 1.105 1.138 0.361 9.465 1678
The table shows descriptive statistics for the board mechanisms, the control variable, and the
performance measure. The board mechanisms are classified according to their primary function
(interest alignment, information provision, and decisiveness) as discussed in section 2. Table A.1 in
the appendix defines the variables.
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3.2 Interest alignment
As we argued in section 2.1, the alignment of interest between principals and
agents may be influenced by the firm’s ownership structure and by the degree
of independence between the board and the CEO. According to table 3.1, the
three largest owners as a group have on average a simple majority (49.8% of the
equity). The average largest owner has less than one third (29.3%), which means
the largest owner cannot alone block a charter amendment, which requires a two
thirds majority.3 This pattern supports the impression from section 3.1 that the
ownership concentration of Norwegian firms is low by international standards.
The important implication in our setting is that the resulting separation between
outside ownership and insider control makes the board a particularly important
vehicle for reducing potentially large agency costs.
Because inside ownership increases the directors’ incentives to monitor the
CEO, it also reduces outside owners’ need to monitor the board. According to
table 3.1, insiders (officers and directors) as a group hold on average 7.4% of the
equity, and the CEO owns 3.6%. These figures reflect that large, powerful owners
are mostly absent as inside monitors. Table 3.2 spells out the relationship between
the equity holdings of the CEO and of the non-CEO directors.
Table 3.2 The relative frequency of equity ownership by firm insiders
Directors CEO owns Average
own no shares shares Total N holding, %
no shares 35.9 14.3 50.2 937
shares 6.0 43.8 49.8 928 12.9
Total % 41.9 58.1 100.0
N 782 1083 1865
Average
holding, % 6.4 16.7
Value df p-value
Pearson χ2 676.4 1 0.000
The table shows the relative frequency by which the firm’s CEO and the non-CEO directors hold
equity in the firm. The two-sided Pearson χ2 statistic tests the null hypothesis that the joint
distribution of the cell counts in a two-dimensional contingency table equals the product of the row
and column marginals (Agresti, 1990, p. 42-47).
More than 40% of the CEOs do not own shares in the firm they run, and half
3Bøhren and Ødegaard (2006) show that there is little need to distinguish between cash flow
rights (which is used in table 3.1) and voting rights in our setting. The figures are almost identical
if non-voting shares are ignored in the table.
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the firms have boards where no director owns any of the firm’s equity. The average
holdings when the CEO (the directors) do invest is 6.4% (12.9%). The table also
shows that the tendency to hold the firm’s shares is positively correlated across
the two insider types in a statistically significant way. Neither the directors nor
the CEO holds equity in 35.9% of the firms, whereas both do in 43.8% of the cases,
when the average sum of their holding is 19.5%.
Thus, unlike what would be expected from an agency logic, the two insider
ownership characteristics are used as complementary rather than substitute ways of
reducing agency costs: The directors’ economic incentives to monitor are stronger
(high director equity stakes) the smaller the need for such monitoring (high CEO
equity stake) and vice versa. This suggests owners tend to either overinvest or
underinvest in these two alignment mechanisms.4
The average value of the independence proxy as defined in expression (2.1) is
-0.275. The same value follows from the separate tenure figures reported for these
two insider types, which are 2.2 and 1.9 years, respectively. This means the average
CEO has slightly longer tenure than the firm’s average director.5 However, the
large difference between the extreme values of the tenure variables and also the high
standard deviation of the independence proxy reflect considerable cross-sectional
variation in expression (2.1), which is necessary to validly test the independence
hypothesis. For instance, the average director took office almost 13 years before
the CEO in the strongest independence case and more than 10 years after in the
strongest dependence case.
3.3 Information provision
Table 3.1 shows that the CEO is not a director in the firm in 70% of the cases.
Every third CEO sits on another listed firm’s board (exported CEO director), and
4As documented by the maximum value of 1 for every ownership structure variable in table
3.1, we have not yet weeded out all data errors. However, since the averages are so close to what
has been found in a similar sample earlier (Bøhren and Ødegaard, 2006), we do not think these
errors have any noticeable effect on our conclusions.
5CEO tenure and chair tenure in the table both have higher maximum values (16) than the
number of sample years (14). This is because we collect board data from 1986 in order to reduce
the censoring bias for firms listed in the beginning of the sample period. Still, as we do not have
access to backward-looking board and CEO data for firms that became listed after 1989, tenure
is certainly underestimated. However, since the independence proxy we use in the statistical
tests is the difference between director tenure and CEO tenure, we have no reason to believe that
this measure is biased.
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the maximum is six outside seats.6 Still, the typical (median) CEO has no outside
directorships. More details are given in table 3.3.
Table 3.3 The CEO’s inside and outside directorships
Number of CEO’s
CEO is director outside directorships
on own board? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 N
Yes 69.4 18.8 5.8 4.4 0.8 0.3 0.5 653
No 79.2 15.4 3.9 1.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 1554
Either 76.3 16.4 4.4 2.2 0.4 0.1 0.1
N 1684 363 98 48 8 3 3 2207
Value df p-value
Pearson χ2 48.2 6 0.000
The table shows the frequency with which the CEO holds directorships in other firms, conditional on
whether the CEO is (’Yes’) or is not (’No’) a director on own board. The two-sided Pearson χ2 tests
the null hypothesis that the joint distribution of the cell counts in a two-dimensional contingency
table equals the product of the row and column marginals (Agresti, 1990, p. 42-47).
The second column and the bottom row show that a CEO sits significantly more
often on other firms’ boards when he is also a director in the firm he runs (30.6%)
than otherwise (20.8%). This holds for any number of outside directorships. Thus,
a potentially problematic principal-agent relationship inside the firm (the agent
monitors himself) tends to make the CEO create the same problem in other firms
(one agent by profession monitors another agent by profession). The dominating
pattern is still that CEOs are not also directors, neither in the firm they run
nor elsewhere. By necessity, the same holds for imported CEO directors. For
the board as a whole, the average number of outside directorships per member is
roughly one half. It also turns out that these frequencies have decreased over the
sample period. For instance, whereas 34.7% of the CEOs were on their own board
and held on average 0.4 outside board seats in 1989, the corresponding figures are
25.1% and 0.3 in 2002.
Figure 3.1 uses the sample firms for 1997 to illustrate the logic of the informa-
tion centrality measure, which we use to construct the director network variable.
A node represents a firm, and a line reflects a connection between two firms
created by multiple directorships. The more lines that pass through a node, the
stronger the firm’s information centrality. Firms that do not share any director
with any other firm have no lines and are isolated from the network. Such firms
6Since we only have directorship data for listed firms, we are underestimating the true number
of outside directorships.
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Figure 3.1 The sample firms in 1997 and their connections. Each dot represents
a firm, and each line represents a joint director. Dots without lines attached
indicate a firm with no joint director. The graph has a random layout, and some
unconnected firms are ignored for expositional reasons.
constitute 33.8% of the sample in 1997. When a director sits on other boards,
he meets directors who may be on other boards with still other directors, and so
on. This means the firm gets access to a network which is determined by both
direct and indirect director overlap. The more direct and indirect links, the better
connected the firm is, and the shorter it needs to travel in order to reach key parts
of the information network. The mean score on the network variable is 0.184,
varying between 0.069 and 0.320.
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3.4 Decisiveness
The third section of table 3.1 reports summary statistics for board size, gender,
age, and employee directors. Because the incentives of employee directors may
make them behave differently in boards than stockholder-elected directors, we
measure board size both with (Size) and without (Size1) employee directors.
The average board size is six directors, and one less if we ignore employee
directors. This is a very small board by international standards.7 Although the
largest boards become less common over time, average size is quite stable. For
instance, the largest board observed over the sample period has 15 members, but
the maximum in 2002 is 12. The 25% largest boards had on average 8.97 members
in the first half of the sample period and 8.67 in the second.
The average fraction of women on the board is 4.7% (Gender). It drops to 2.5%
if we exclude boards with employee directors (Gender1), and rises to 7.8% in boards
with employee directors (Gender2). Thus, employees elect women considerably
more often than the owners. On average, the fraction of elected women is 3.4%
among the owners (Gender3) and 15% among the employees (Gender4).8
Table 3.4 shows how the use of female directors varies with board size under the
five different definitions of gender diversity. Although the proportion of females
tends to decrease with board size when the board has no employee directors and
otherwise when boards are small, the overall relationship between board size and
the fraction of female directors is positive and significant for the full sample.
The dynamics of gender diversity over the sample period is shown in table 3.5.
The message is that although the substitution of male directors by female has been
going on all the time, the tendency is particularly strong after 1995. The fraction
of female directors is two to three times higher in the end of the sample period
than in the middle.
Like gender, director age is a potential source of board diversity. Table 3.1
shows that the average CEO is 47 years old and roughly three years younger than
the directors. The average age per board varies between 27.2 and 73.5 years. We
measure a board’s age diversity by the standard deviation of its directors’ age.
7Wymeersch (1998, p. 1105-1109) reports an average board size of 10.07 in the UK, 12.05 in
France, 10.44 in Belgium, 12.00 in Italy, and 6.54 in the Netherlands. The average size of the
German supervisory board is 13.25 (Hopt, 1998, p. 248). Carter and Lorsch (2004) find that the
average US board has about 12 directors, which is down from 16 in the 1980s.
8The number of observations for Gender2 (the proportion of females in firms with employee
directors) and Gender4 (the proportion of females among employee directors) is lower than for
other variables. This is because Gender2 and Gender4 are only defined for the subsample of
firms with employee directors.
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Table 3.4 The average fraction of female directors by board size
Board
size gender N gender1 N gender2 N gender3 N gender4 N
2 0.093 27 0.046 27 0.089 28
3 0.036 204 0.012 204 0.035 242
4 0.012 252 0.003 244 0.063 8 0.014 439 0.016 8
5 0.028 464 0.005 419 0.211 45 0.030 726 0.015 45
6 0.044 387 0.004 257 0.218 130 0.045 510 0.014 130
7 0.055 382 0.004 88 0.128 294 0.049 203 0.009 294
8 0.064 255 0.004 28 0.125 227 0.060 44 0.008 227
9 0.104 146 0.002 5 0.131 141 0.049 9 0.012 141
10 0.076 51 0.116 51 0.100 2 0.008 51
11 0.154 33 0.356 33 0.014 33
12 0.083 2 0.000 2 0.007 2
13 0.000 2
14 0.000 1 0.000 1 0.000 2
15 0.000 3 0.000 3 0.000 3
Avg 0.047 0.025 0.078 0.034 0.150
Corr 0.208 -0.041 -0.018 -0.042 0.078
N 2207 1273 934 2207 934
The table shows the percentage of female directors across different board sizes. ’Avg’ is the average
of the variable, ’Gender’ is the fraction of female directors in all boards, ’Gender1’ (’Gender2’) is the
fraction of female directors in boards without (with) employee directors, and ’Gender3’ (’Gender4’) is
the fraction of female stockholder-elected (employee-elected) directors. Underlined Pearson’s
correlations (’Corr’) between size and gender (2-tailed) are significant at the 5% level.
This measure is eight years on average, varying between zero (every director has
the same age) and 21.9 years.
Table 3.1 shows that when we consider all boards regardless of whether or
not they have employee directors, there is about one employee director per board
on average. According to the second column of table 3.6, 41.5% of the sample
firms have employees on their boards. This proportion has declined over the years
from a typical value of 50% in the first half of the sample period to less than
40% in the second. The reason may be a higher proportion of firms in exempted
industries, a relative increase in the fraction of small firms or a larger proportion of
firms organized as holding companies. The table also shows that when employees
are represented, they have between one and four directors. Two or three are the
dominating cases, three gradually becoming the most common number.
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Table 3.5 The average fraction of female directors per year
Year Gender N Gender1 N Gender2 N Gender3 N Gender4 N
1989 0.028 95 0.016 49 0.042 46 0.008 95 0.134 46
1990 0.036 99 0.028 50 0.043 49 0.019 99 0.112 49
1991 0.027 93 0.007 46 0.047 47 0.009 93 0.135 47
1992 0.030 95 0.011 44 0.046 51 0.014 95 0.118 51
1993 0.031 91 0.006 45 0.055 46 0.017 91 0.128 46
1994 0.038 101 0.020 53 0.059 48 0.027 101 0.104 48
1995 0.040 186 0.018 115 0.075 71 0.029 186 0.140 71
1996 0.046 192 0.027 118 0.075 74 0.037 192 0.120 74
1997 0.037 215 0.018 135 0.069 80 0.028 215 0.131 80
1998 0.047 217 0.018 128 0.089 89 0.031 217 0.180 89
1999 0.055 213 0.026 122 0.095 91 0.037 213 0.190 91
2000 0.057 209 0.034 122 0.090 87 0.046 209 0.156 87
2001 0.061 202 0.033 123 0.104 79 0.047 202 0.173 79
2002 0.081 199 0.051 123 0.130 76 0.068 199 0.207 76
Avg 0.047 0.025 0.078 0.034 0.15
N 2207 1273 934 2207 934
The table shows the mean number of female directors for each year. ’Avg’ is the average of the
variable, ’Gender’ is the fraction of female directors in all boards, ’Gender1’ (’Gender2’) is the
fraction of female directors in boards without (with) employee directors, and ’Gender3’ (’Gender4’) is
the fraction of female stockholder-elected (employee-elected) directors.
3.5 Performance
We measure economic performance by Tobin’s Q and operationalize it as the mar-
ket value of assets per unit book value. The market value of debt is set equal
to its book value. The average (median) Q in the sample firms is 1.48 (1.14),
with a minimum of 0.36 and a maximum of 9.47. Since we will later regress Q
on board characteristics while controlling for firm size, we use sales rather than
assets to measure size because Q is defined in terms of assets. Table 3.7 reports
the mean value of each board characteristic across the performance deciles. The
rightmost column shows the difference between the highest and lowest decile and
its statistical significance.
In this univariate setting, most board mechanisms are related to extreme values
of performance in a statistically significant way. Under the alignment perspective,
inside (outside) ownership concentration relates positively (negatively) to perfor-
mance, and both directors and CEOs perform better in the early years of their
service period than later. The information mechanisms suggest that a CEO should
not be on his own board, whereas outside directorships for non-CEOs is beneficial
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Table 3.6 The relative frequency of employee directors by year and number
No. of employee directors
Year 0 1 2 3 4 N
1989 52,6 2,1 30,5 13,7 1,1 95
1990 49,5 5,1 32,3 13,1 0,0 99
1991 49,5 5,4 26,9 18,3 0,0 93
1992 45,3 9,5 26,3 18,9 0,0 95
1993 49,5 7,7 24,2 18,7 0,0 91
1994 53,5 6,9 23,8 15,8 0,0 101
1995 64,5 5,9 17,7 11,3 0,5 186
1996 63,0 5,2 17,7 13,5 0,5 192
1997 62,3 7,0 17,2 13,0 0,5 215
1998 58,1 6,5 18,0 16,6 0,9 217
1999 57,3 5,2 18,3 18,3 0,9 213
2000 62,7 6,2 14,8 15,3 1,0 209
2001 62,9 5,9 13,9 16,3 1,0 202
2002 61,8 6,0 13,6 17,6 1,0 199
Average 58,5 6,0 19,3 15,6 0,6 2207
N 1292 132 425 344 14 2207
and more so the wider the information network it creates. The decisiveness mech-
anisms indicate that more age dispersion is unfavorable, that younger officers and
CEOs perform the best, and that more women increase (decrease) performance
on boards with (without) employees. There is no significant relationship between
extreme values of Q and board independence, board size (except when we exclude
employee directors), and the use of employee directors.
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Table 3.7 Board characteristics across performance deciles
Decile of Tobin’s Q
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10-1
Alignment
Insider holdings 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.06**
Directors’ holdings 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.13 0.06**
CEO holdings 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.02
Herfindahl index 0.21 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.09 -0.12**
Three largest owners 0.56 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.46 0.47 0.43 0.37 -0.19**
Largest outsider 0.34 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.22 0.18 -0.16**
Insider ownership 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.06**
Independence -0.03 -0.42 -0.40 -0.65 -0.34 -0.08 -0.75 -0.22 -0.13 -0.22 -0.19
Board tenure 2.38 2.38 2.29 2.06 2.17 2.37 2.38 2.20 1.81 1.64 -0.74**
CEO tenure 2.42 2.80 2.69 2.72 2.52 2.46 3.13 2.42 1.94 1.86 -0.55**
Chair tenure 2.55 2.27 2.13 2.22 1.96 2.31 2.33 2.33 2.00 1.70 -0.84**
Information
CEO director 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.31 0.22 0.17 -0.11**
Exported CEO 0.39 0.28 0.34 0.39 0.36 0.47 0.36 0.36 0.33 0.30 -0.09
Imported CEO 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.01
Outside directorships 0.56 0.43 0.45 0.51 0.55 0.58 0.51 0.57 0.68 0.84 0.28**
Network 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.03**
continued on next page
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Decile of Tobin’s Q
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10-1
Decisiveness
Size 6.14 6.03 6.55 6.50 6.66 6.42 6.68 6.40 6.11 6.00 -0.14
Size1 5.25 5.24 5.51 5.50 5.45 5.31 5.28 5.29 5.12 5.04 -0.20*
Gender 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.00
Gender1 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.03**
Gender2 0.10 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.17 0.17 0.22 0.17 0.32 0.22**
Board age 52.16 51.19 51.62 50.96 50.74 51.73 51.64 51.77 49.87 49.86 -2.30**
Board age dispersion 8.56 8.58 8.48 8.12 7.93 8.36 8.09 8.01 7.61 7.84 -0.71**
CEO age 48.15 47.17 48.01 47.48 47.53 47.25 48.42 47.37 46.00 44.65 -3.50**
Employee directors 0.90 0.79 1.04 1.00 1.22 1.10 1.39 1.10 0.99 0.96 0.06
Fraction employee directors 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.02
Controls
Firm size 12.97 13.48 13.40 13.44 13.72 13.57 13.91 13.39 13.05 12.29 -0.68**
Risk 0.70 0.70 0.64 0.70 0.71 0.74 0.80 0.85 0.91 1.01 0.31**
Performance
Q 0.71 0.88 0.95 1.02 1.10 1.19 1.31 1.52 2.00 4.17 3.46**
The table shows the average value of variables listed in the first column for each decile of Tobin’s Q. The rightmost column shows the difference between
deciles 10 (highest Q decile) and 1 (lowest Q decile). Based on a z test, one (two) star(s) reflects a difference which is statistically significant at the 10%
(5%) level. There are 167 firms in deciles 1 and 10 and 168 in the others. The variables are defined in table A.1.
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3.6 Comovement among the board design mech-
anisms
Table 3.8 shows the bivariate correlations between any pair of independent vari-
ables to be used in the regression models of chapter 4 and also their partial cor-
relations with Tobin’s Q. Significant correlations at the five per cent level are
underlined.
The table shows that although many variables have a bivariate correlation co-
efficient which differs significantly from zero at the 5% level, they are still small.
A rule of thumb suggests the correlation coefficient must exceed 0.7 before multi-
collinearity problems become problematic in regressions.9 Also, in order to avoid
high correlations, our regressions will only use definitions of size and gender that
exclude employee directors. To illustrate, the Pearson correlation between board
size and the percentage of employee directors is 0.646 when employee directors are
included in the size measure (Size). As shown in the table, the correlation is only
0.068 when the size measure ignores employee directors (Size1).
9Moreover, Hsiao (1986, p. 2-3) points out that multicollinearity is unlikely to cause trouble
in panel data settings, since this normally involves more data points and larger data variability
than in a cross-section.
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Table 3.8 Bivariate correlations between variables used in the regression models
Dirs Herfx Indep Ceodir Expceo Impceo Netw Size Gend Agediv Edfra Fisize Risk
Tobq 0.102 -0.151 0.028 -0.042 -0.039 0.032 0.105 -0.094 -0.061 -0.073 0.002 -0.188 0.141
Ob 1.000 -0.079 0.013 0.000 0.031 -0.009 0.033 0.056 -0.002 -0.073 0.002 -0.054 -0.094
Herfx 1.000 -0.036 0.058 -0.014 -0.019 -0.128 -0.048 0.121 -0.007 0.020 -0.002 -0.173
Indep 1.000 -0.026 -0.083 -0.001 -0.020 -0.089 0.026 -0.019 -0.046 -0.077 0.043
Ceodir 1.000 0.142 -0.085 -0.089 -0.050 -0.040 0.032 -0.193 0.035 0.090
Expceo 1.000 0.019 0.150 0.008 0.042 0.001 0.004 0.133 0.073
Impceo 1.000 0.046 -0.060 -0.069 -0.044 -0.067 -0.026 0.060
Network 1.000 0.172 -0.057 -0.016 0.065 0.190 0.155
Size1 1.000 0.064 0.145 0.070 0.234 -0.062
Gender 1.000 -0.032 0.091 0.081 -0.074
Agestd 1.000 -0.075 -0.028 -0.083
Edpst 1.000 0.258 -0.082
Lnaccinc 1.000 0.093
Risk 1.000
The table shows the Pearson bivariate correlation coefficients between variables used in the regressions. Underlined correlations are significantly different
from zero at the 5% level. ’Tobq’ is Tobin’s Q, ’Dirs’ is director ownership, ’Herfx’ is the Herfindahl index for outside owners, ’Indep’ is Independence,
’Ceodir’ is CEO director, ’Expceo’ is Exported CEO, ’Impceo’ is Imported CEO, ’Netw’ is Network, ’Size’ is board size (employee directors excluded),
’Gend’ is Gender (employee directors excluded), ’Agediv’ is Board age dispersion, ’Edfra’ is the Fraction of employee directors, and ’Fisize’ is firm size.
The variables are defined in table A.1.
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3.7 Summary
This chapter on descriptive statistics was organized according to the three major
functions that board design mechanisms may have. The findings on interest align-
ment show that because both outside and inside ownership concentration are low
in our sample firms, potential agency costs are high. Also, insider ownership by
the CEO and by the directors tend to be complements rather than substitutes.
This setting makes the board’s monitoring function questionable from an agency
standpoint, particularly in firms where low inside equity holdings produce both
weak value maximization incentives for the CEO and weak monitoring incentives
for the directors. The board’s independence of the CEO is medium in the sense
that the CEO and the average director have roughly the same tenure.
The CEO is a director in the firm he runs in less than one third of the cases,
and those who are sit on other listed firms’ boards more often than others. This
is still the exception than the rule, and more common at the beginning of the
sample period than in the end. Our information centrality measure, which reflects
the direct and indirect nature of multiple board positions per director, shows that
boards differ considerably in their director-driven access to outside information.
The board’s decisiveness is strong if small size helps, as the average board
has only six directors. If more diversity reduces decision speed, the gender mix
should be beneficial as well. The average fraction of female directors is only 5%,
although ten percent points higher in firms with employee directors and increasing
considerably over time. Age represents much more diversity than board size and
gender. The typical director is forty seven years old, average director age per board
varies by almost fifty years across the sample firms, and there are often large age
variations within the board. Less than half the firms have employee directors, and
the fraction declines over time.
These board mechanisms have low pairwise correlations, suggesting that mul-
ticollinearity will not be a problem in regressions. Most of these mechanisms are
significantly different in firms with particularly low versus particularly high per-
formance. The next chapter explores the relationship between board design and
performance in a systematic, multivariate way.
Chapter 4
Statistical tests
4.1 The basic model
Based on the theoretical discussion in chapter 2 and the descriptive statistics in
chapter 3, we want to investigate the following relationship between economic
performance and board design mechanisms:
Q = Constant + β1Directors’ holdings + β2(Directors’ holdings)
2 (4.1)
+ β3Outside concentration + β4Independence
+ β5CEO director dummy + β6Exported CEO+ β7Imported CEO
+ β8Network
+ β9Size + β10Gender + β11Board age dispersion
+ β12Fraction employee directors
+ γ1Firm size + γ2Risk + uit
Because table 3.2 showed that insider ownership by non-CEO officers and by
the CEO are strongly correlated, we use only the directors’ aggregate holdings
in (4.1). We also remove employee directors from the proxies for independence,
age diversity, network, size, and gender. This approach reduces multicollinearity
problems and also enables us to separate the effects of shareholder directors from
those of employee directors. On the other hand, several predictions from chapter 2
do not distinguish between director types, such as the relationship between board
size and decisiveness. We return to that issue in chapter 5 by including employee
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directors in the size, independence, and gender proxies. Finally, we account for the
control variables firm size and risk. Firm size is measured by the log of accounting
income, and risk is measured as the firm’s equity beta.
Our data set involves repeated observations of the same firm for up to four-
teen years. Since this is a panel data setting, we will use the firm level fixed
effects (FE) model and estimate it by GLS and GMM. Although the FE model is
the most frequently used panel data method, most corporate governance research
has ignored the time-series nature of the data and instead used a pooled cross
section approach to analyze cross-sectional time-series data. A serious problem
with this method is that it ignores possible correlation between observable and
non-observable variables in general and the unobserved heterogeneity of firms in
particular. This happens because each firm, which turns up several times in the
data set, changes its identity only slowly over time. A panel data approach controls
for such correlated, time-invariant heterogeneity across firms, even if it cannot be
observed. We may, so to speak, control for the firm’s identity.
In contrast, researchers using cross-sectional regressions on a pooled sample
include control variables such as age and industry in order to capture this persis-
tent, unobserved heterogeneity across firms. But two shipping firms founded in
the same year may still have different optimal board design mechanisms. This is
because they differ in terms of exogenous characteristics such as location, stage in
the life-cycle, and risk. We analyze the seriousness of ignoring this heterogeneity
in chapter 5, where we compare the results from OLS estimation in pooled cross-
sectional models to those we find with panel data methods. A further advantage
of panel methods is that the moments needed for GMM estimation are readily
available from the data structure itself. This property is discussed in section 4.2.
The disadvantage of FE models is that because time invariant variables can-
not be included, the separate impact of characteristics like firm type and industry
membership must be ignored. Still, the FE model will take account of firm hetero-
geneity far better than what is possible under alternative techniques. Moreover,
the is no time invariant explanatory variables in our model as specified in (4.1).
The basic FE model is defined by Woolridge (2002, p. 251) (see also Green
(1993, p. 615-623)) as
Qit = θ + βX
′
it + ci + uit


i = 1, 2, . . . , N
t = 1, 2, . . . , T
(4.2)
Here, i is the firm, t is the time period, θ is a constant,Xit = (xi1t, xi2t, . . . , xiKt) is
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a vector ofK+1 explanatory variables, β is the corresponding vector of coefficients,
ci is the unobserved individual, time-independent effect of firm i, and uit is the
idiosyncratic error, which varies across firms and time periods. We observe Qit
and Xit and want to estimate β while holding the unobserved individual effect ci
constant. The error term uit is assumed to be uncorrelated with Xit and ci.
For each variable and each individual firm, the model amounts to subtracting
the year’s observation from the overall mean of the variable for that firm. The
resulting time demeaned dependent variable is
Q˜it = Qit −
1
T
T∑
t=1
Qit (4.3)
Using the same procedure for the independent variables by demeaning {Xit into
X˜it, the FE estimation equation may now be written as:
Q˜it = βX˜
′
it + u˜it


i = 1, 2, . . . , N
t = 1, 2, . . . , T
(4.4)
Since the unobserved, individual heterogeneity ci is constant over time per firm,
it disappears through the time-demeaning procedure because each year’s value of ci
is identical to its mean value. Thus, the individual firm heterogeneity is controlled
for.
The need to use control variables becomes less important under a fixed effects
model. Nevertheless, in order to take account of possible performance effects of
firm size and risk, we include the log of accounting income as a measure of firm
size, and equity beta as a risk proxy. The inclusion of risk may be motivated
by the Raheja (2005) model, where monitoring becomes more valuable the more
risky the environment. Thus, risk is a truly exogenous variable. In the robustness
section (table 5.2) we also run a model without the control variables.
We will use the FE approach in a number of settings. First, we estimate the
basic model (4.1) with time-demeaned variables in section 4.2, using GLS and
GMM techniques. Subsequently, we explore reverse causation and endogeneity of
board design mechanisms in section 4.3. Finally, reverse causation and endogeneity
is analyzed in a dynamic FE model in section 4.4, where we introduce lagged
performance and thereby allow for feedback from past firm performance to current
board design. Section 4.5 summarizes our test results.
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4.2 Static fixed effects estimation
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show the estimates for the fixed effects model under GLS and
GMM estimation, respectively. The full specification in expression (4.1) is esti-
mated as model (A) in the tables, and the remaining models (B)-(G) are partial
versions of (A). A partial model includes the control variables and either one or
two of the three sets of board design mechanisms. The assumption underlying
these models is that all governance mechanisms and control variables are strictly
exogenous. That is, E (uit|Xi1, . . . , XiT , ci) = 0 when t = 1, . . . , T . These are the
moment conditions, from which instruments may be constructed. Thus, unlike
under simultaneous equations estimation, instruments may be constructed from
within the panel data structure itself.
In order to identify the coefficients in the GMM models, we had to construct
a number of instruments. First, we used the raw (Amemiya and MaCurdy, 1986),
the time-demeaned, and the squared time-demeaned explanatory variables. Fur-
thermore, we included the average and standard deviation of firm-demeaned ex-
planatory variables (Breusch et al., 1989). Firm-demeaning is achieved by taking
the average of the governance mechanism or control variable across firms for each
time period. Thus, the specific instruments used in each regression in table 4.2
varies with the explanatory variables included in each model. Our choice of in-
struments illustrates the advantage of panel data that modified variables used in
the model can also be used as instruments. Finally, variables not included in the
regressions, such as the CEO’s age and ownership stake, are used as instruments
as well. These sets of instruments are used for all GMM models in chapter 4.
Overall fit as measured by R2 is high in every GLS model in table 4.1. The F
statistics are significant, and the Breusch-Pagan tests show that the error terms
are homoscedastic. Correspondingly, the GMM estimations in table 4.2 show that
according to Hansen’s J statistic, the instruments are relevant in most regressions.
The overidentification test statistic suggests that the instruments are uncorrelated
with the error term in every regression except in model (B), where only alignment
variables are retained.
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Table 4.1 Firm performance explained by board design mechanisms, using GLS
to estimate seven fixed effects models.
Variable (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
Alignment
Directors’ holdings 0.507 0.558 0.464 0.592
Directors’ holdings sqrd -0.414 -0.522 -0.431 -0.502
Herfindahl index 0.283 0.339 0.379 0.237
Independence -0.014 -0.014 -0.012 -0.015
Information
CEO director 0.058 0.078 0.074 0.061
Exported CEO -0.026 -0.018 -0.024 -0.018
Imported CEO -0.052 0.015 0.014 -0.049
Network 1.621∗∗ 1.625∗∗ 1.641∗∗ 1.621∗∗
Decisiveness
Size -0.077∗∗ -0.055∗∗ -0.063∗∗ -0.072∗∗
Gender -0.808∗∗ -1.053∗∗ -1.010∗∗ -0.842∗∗
Board age dispersion 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000
Employee directors -1.252∗∗ -1.255∗∗ -1.272∗∗ -1.249∗∗
Controls
Firm size -0.056∗∗ -0.066∗∗ -0.062∗∗ -0.059∗∗ -0.063∗∗ - 0.060∗∗ -0.055∗∗
Risk 0.025 0.060 0.038 0.031 0.044 0.038 0.018
N 1510 1510 1520 1520 1510 1510 1520
Centred R2 0.665 0.658 0.657 0.657 0.659 0.659 0.664
F -test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Breusch-Pagan (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
The table shows estimates of GLS regression models where the dependent variable is the time
demeaned Tobin’s Q, which we measure as the market value of the firm over its book value. The full
specification in equation (4.1) is estimated as model (A), and models (B)-(G) are partial versions of
(A). Besides the control variables, a partial model includes one or two of the three sets of board
design mechanisms (alignment, information, and decisiveness). For each firm and each variable, time
demeaning involves subtracting a given year’s observation from the firm’s overall mean. Significant
results at the 5% (10%) level are marked with ∗∗ (∗).
Thus, both estimation methods show satisfactory test statistics. Furthermore,
estimated coefficient signs and significant results are very consistent across the
two estimation methods, and the coefficients are quite similar across the six model
specifications for a given estimation method. To simplify the discussion, we focus
initially on the full model (A) and GMM as reported in table 4.2, limiting the
attention to estimated coefficients with a p-value of 10% or less.
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Table 4.2 Firm performance explained by board design mechanisms, using GMM
to estimate seven fixed effects models.
Variable (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
Alignment
Directors’ holdings 0.924∗ 0.694 0.855∗ 0.817
Directors’ holdings sqrd -0.712 -0.702 -0.709 -0.738
Herfindahl index 0.192 0.182 0.257∗∗ 0.131
Independence -0.011∗ -0.011∗ -0.010 -0.011∗∗
Information
CEO director 0.081∗ 0.084 0.109∗∗ 0.067
Exported CEO -0.030 -0.019 -0.030 -0.023
Imported CEO -0.055 -0.014 -0.018 -0.063
Network 1.385∗∗ 1.260∗∗ 1.392∗∗ 1.362∗∗
Decisiveness
Size -0.053∗∗ -0.041∗∗ -0.040∗∗ -0.049∗∗
Gender -0.626∗∗ -0.862∗∗ -0.850∗∗ -0.623∗∗
Board age dispersion 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
Employee directors -1.061∗∗ -1.131∗∗ -1.160∗∗ -1.048∗∗
Controls
Firm size -0.036∗∗ -0.038∗∗ -0.035∗ -0.029∗ -0.040∗∗ -0.035∗∗ -0.026
Risk -0.002 0.005 -0.007 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.005
N 1502 1502 1507 1507 1502 1502 1507
J statistic 34.322 42.572 21.888 16.210 35.523 36.326 21.534
J ’s p-value 0.357 0.000 0.237 0.578 0.061 0.067 0.761
Over ID test 26.950 30.439 25.483 25.095 22.676 28.217 24.478
ID test p-value 0.720 0.016 0.112 0.122 0.539 0.298 0.604
The table shows estimates of GMM regression models where the dependent variable is the time
demeaned Tobin’s Q, which we measure as the market value of the firm over its book value. The full
specification in equation (4.1) is estimated as model (A), and models (B)-(G) are partial versions of
(A). Besides the control variables, a partial model includes one or two of the three sets of board
design mechanisms (alignment, information, and decisiveness). For each firm and each variable, time
demeaning involves subtracting a given year’s observation from the firm’s overall mean. Significant
results at the 5% (10%) level are marked with ∗∗ (∗). The instruments are the raw, the
time-demeaned, and the squared time-demeaned explanatory variables, the average and standard
deviation of firm-demeaned explanatory variables, and variables not included in the regressions.
For the alignment mechanisms, there is a positive, significant relationship be-
tween performance and insider ownership as measured by directors’ holdings. This
is consistent with the extant literature, although the negative sign on the squared
insider holdings is not statistically significant (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Gu-
gler, 2001). The insignificant effect of outside ownership concentration is consistent
with several other studies summarized in Gugler (2001). Also, as discussed in sec-
tion 2.1, it has often been found that when more board design mechanisms than
just ownership are included in a regression model, the significant relationship be-
tween insider ownership and performance tends to disappear (Byrd and Hickman,
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1992; Cotter et al., 1997; Bhagat and Black, 2002). Yet, we are able to confirm
the major findings in the ownership structure research.
The negative, significant relationship between board independence and per-
formance is consistent with the argument that although more independence may
improve monitoring intensity, independent directors are less knowledgeable about
the firm than dependent ones. The finding is also in line with Yermack (1996);
Klein (1998); Bhagat and Black (2002), who use different independence measures
than we do.
The positive performance effect due to multiple directorships is the most signif-
icant information provision mechanisms. Thus, the higher the information central-
ity of the directors’ seats on other boards, the more the firm benefits from outside
directorships. This finding shows that our information centrality measure, which
reflects the direct and indirect information links created to other firms when our
firm’s directors meet directors on other boards, does indeed pick up information
sources with beneficial economic effects. The positive, significant sign for the CEO
director variable is in line with results in Brickley et al. (1997).
Moving on to the board’s decisiveness, every coefficient estimate except the one
for age diversity is negative and significant. The finding that performance decreases
with increasing board size is in line with the existing literature (Yermack, 1996;
Eisenberg et al., 1998). It is remarkable that this relationship also turns up in our
sample firms, which mostly have very small boards by international standards.
Adding the finding that gender diversity is inversely associated with performance,
it seems that homogeneous, small groups work better than large, heterogeneous
ones. Finally, and consistent with the theoretical arguments of Williamson (1996)
and Cadbury (2002), the use of employee directors is negatively associated with the
firm’s market value. This result supports the idea that employee directors defend
their benefits at the expense of owners and creditors. It is also consistent with
recent Canadian evidence that when employees have a strong voice in corporate
governance, the firm is less efficient (Falaye et al., 2004).
The fact that the pattern in the full model (A) mostly survives in the simpler
models (B)-(G) suggests that the three major classes of board design mechanisms
(alignment, information, and decisiveness) are quite independently related to cor-
porate performance.
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4.3 Endogeneity and reverse causation
The results in section 4.2 may be biased due to endogeneity and reverse causation.
In order to explore this possibility, we estimate five different equations, where
the dependent variables are Directors’ holdings, Independence, Network, and Size,
respectively.
The estimation is carried out equation-by-equation in a fixed effects model us-
ing GMM. That is, we do not build a system of equations and jointly estimate
their parameters. Compared to this alternative, our approach is preferable for
two reasons (Krishnakumar, 1996, p. 202). First, because the true system of
simultaneous equations is unknown, estimated coefficients in a misspecified simul-
taneous system will be biased. In particular, if the system misspecifies one local
equation, the estimates of the other equations in the system will be contaminated.
Thus, estimating each regression separately helps us keep the misspecification lo-
cal. Second, estimation per equation provides consistent estimates for the system
when instruments are taken from the conditional moment restrictions, which are
produced from the panel structure of the data (Woolridge, 2002, p. 310).
As in section 4.2, we construct the instruments from the explanatory variables.
Since firm performance is now an independent variable in four of the five regres-
sions, we also use performance to construct instruments. Table 4.3 shows our
findings.
For ease of comparison, column (A) reproduces the results from table 4.2. The
table shows that there is two-way causation between governance on the one hand
and independence, network, and board size on the other. Thus, more independence
and larger boards both reduce performance (seen from the performance equation),
whereas better performance produces more dependent boards and reduced board
size (from the independence equation and size equation, respectively). Finally, the
internal, two-way feedback between performance and network is positive. Thus,
directors with a strong information network both improve performance and tend
to be attracted to well-performing firms.
38 CHAPTER 4. STATISTICAL TESTS
Table 4.3 Reverse causation and endogenous board design mechanisms estimated
in separate GMM regressions of four fixed effects models. The instruments corre-
spond to those used in table 4.2.
Dependent variable
Independent Directors’ Inde-
variable Performance holdings pendence Network Size
Alignment
Directors’ holdings 0.924∗ 1.378 0.064 0.823
Directors’ holdings sqrd -0.712 -1.669 -0.061 -0.351
Herfindahl index 0.192 0.048∗ -0.381 -0.065∗∗ -1.088∗∗
Independence -0.011∗ -0.001 -0.001 -0.034∗∗
Information
CEO director 0.081∗ -0.018∗∗ -0.355∗∗ -0.014∗∗ 0.024
Exported CEO -0.030 0.005 -0.234∗∗ 0.007∗∗ -0.044
Imported CEO -0.055 -0.020 -0.322 -0.033∗ -0.505∗∗
Network 1.385∗∗ 0.025 -0.792 1.023∗∗
Decisiveness
Size -0.05∗∗ 0.009∗∗ -0.245∗∗ 0.008∗∗
Gender -0.626∗∗ 0.067 0.868 -0.108∗∗ 0.691∗
Board age dispersion 0.000 -0.003∗∗ 0.077∗∗ -0.001 0.038∗
Employee directors -1.061∗∗ 0.028 -0.915 0.004 -3.838∗∗
Controls
Firm size -0.036∗∗ 0.002 0.060 -0.002 0.061∗∗
Risk -0.002 -0.008 0.146∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.072∗∗
Performance
Tobin’s Q 0.000 -0.094∗∗ 0.012∗∗ -0.085∗∗
N 1502 1502 1502 1502 1502
J statistic 34.322 28.557 141.691 32.238 67.849
J ’s p-value 0.357 0.435 0.000 0.310 0.000
Over ID test 26.915 21.460 171.026 33.620 86.605
ID test p-value 0.720 0.806 0.000 0.254 0.000
The table shows estimates of reverse causation and mechanism endogeneity using five different
dependent variables. Firm performance is measured as the time demeaned Tobin’s Q, which we
operationalize as the market value of the firm over its book value. Model (A) is identical to model
(A) in table 4.2. The other models use a governance mechanism as the dependent variable. For each
firm and each variable, time demeaning involves subtracting a given year’s observation from the
firm’s overall mean across the years. Significant results at the 5% (10%) level are marked with ∗∗ (∗).
Overall, these findings support the hypothesis of Hermalin and Weisbach (1998)
that performance drives independence, and also the Raheja (2005) argument that
board size will decrease as performance improves. Nevertheless, the coefficient of
firm performance is rather low compared to governance variables in every regres-
sion. Thus, we cannot conclude that reverse causation is a serious problem in our
regressions.
The coefficient estimates of the four models to the right in the table show
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that mechanism endogeneity primarily occurs in the information and decisiveness
variables. However, the coefficient estimates are rather low when network is the de-
pendent variable, suggesting that the impact of the other mechanisms on network
is quite moderate. The significant signs are mostly negative across all four models,
reflecting that the mechanisms are substitutes rather than complements. More-
over, the finding that several board design mechanisms are endogeneous rather
than independent is consistent with the equilibrium argument of Demsetz and
Lehn (1985).
Finally, several board design mechanisms are significantly related to exogenous
determinants, such as firm size and risk. For instance, board size grows with firm
size, and the directors’ information network is richer the more risky the firm’s
environment.
To summarize, the evidence in table 4.3 supports the claim that both reverse
causation and mechanism endogeneity exists in our data. However, the reverse
causation is quite moderate, and endogeneity is mostly found among the informa-
tion and decisiveness mechanisms. Neither result invalidates the finding from our
basic model, where we assume that the endogenous performance variable is driven
by the exogenous board design mechanisms.
4.4 The dynamic model
Reverse causation can also be partially captured by including lagged performance
as an independent variable in (4.1). The required assumption is that lagged per-
formance is predetermined (Arellano, 2003, p. 144). Such a variable is potentially
correlated to lagged values of the error term, but uncorrelated with present and
future error terms. This assumption is the so-called sequential moment condition,
which can be expressed as E (uit|Xi1, . . . , Xit, ci) = 0 when (t = 1, . . . , T ), where
lagged performance is one of the explanatory variables. Since this assumption
allows for feedback from the lagged firm performance to the current board mech-
anisms, it may capture the potential reverse causation. If lagged performance is
significant, it suggests board design is at least partially driven by performance.
Thus, we will add lagged firm performance to our basic equation (4.1):
Qt = θ + αQt−1 + β(Governance mechanisms)t + γ(Controls)t + uit (4.5)
where α is the coefficient of lagged performance and β and γ are the coefficient
vectors of the governance mechanisms and control variables, respectively.
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However, including Qt−1 in a fixed effects GLS model will bias the estimate of
α (Hsiao, 1986, p. 73-76). The solution is to use a fixed effects GMM estimation.
Thus, we estimate (4.5) with GMM and include lagged performance in the list of
instruments.
Table 4.4 Dynamic relationships between performance, board design mechanisms
and lagged performance, using GMM to estimate seven fixed effects models. The
estimation uses lagged performance and the instruments from table 4.2.
Variable (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
Alignment
Directors’ holdings 1.076∗∗ 1.022∗∗ 1.103∗∗ 1.035∗∗
Directors’ holdings sqrd -0.905∗ -0.915∗ -0.953∗ -0.900∗
Herfindahl index 0.096 0.153 0.198 0.052
Independence 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.002
Information
CEO director 0.026 0.036 0.033 0.027
Exported CEO -0.022 -0.015 -0.019 -0.017
Imported CEO -0.263 -0.208 -0.215 -0.270
Network 1.144∗∗ 1.140∗∗ 1.099∗∗ 1.205∗∗
Decisiveness
Size -0.063∗∗ -0.052∗∗ -0.055∗∗ -0.056∗∗
Gender -0.494∗∗ -0.680∗∗ -0.636∗∗ -0.510∗∗
Board age dispersion -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.002
Employee directors -0.911∗∗ -0.885∗∗ -0.888∗∗ -0.905∗∗
Past performance
Tobin’s Q lagged 0.095∗ 0.108∗∗ 0.119∗∗ 0.102∗∗ 0.111∗∗ 0.092∗ 0.107∗∗
Controls
Firm size -0.028∗ -0.037∗∗ -0.032∗∗ -0.033∗∗ -0.034∗∗ -0.032∗∗ -0.027∗∗
Risk -0.020∗ -0.022∗ -0.033∗∗ -0.020∗ -0.026∗∗ -0.017 -0.024∗∗
N 1283 1283 1286 1286 1283 1283 1286
J statistic 26.030 23.024 23.028 16.079 27.416 22.065 21.241
J ’s p-value 0.250 0.060 0.060 0.309 0.072 0.229 0.267
Over ID test 27.810 25.693 29.353 25.415 34.160 30.473 27.538
ID test p-value 0.182 0.028 0.009 0.031 0.002 0.033 0.069
The table shows estimates of regression models where the dependent variable is the time demeaned
Tobin’s Q, which we measure as the market value of the firm over its book value. Model A, which is
the full specification, is equation (4.1) augmented by Tobin’s Q lagged one period, and models
(B)-(G) are partial versions of (A). Besides the control variables and past performance, a partial
model includes one or two of the three sets of board design mechanisms (alignment, information, and
decisiveness). For each firm and each variable, time demeaning involves subtracting a given year’s
observation from the firm’s overall mean. Significant results at the 5% (10%) level are marked with
∗∗ (∗).
The results in table 4.4 mostly support the findings from the static models.
We should compare these results to those in table 4.2, since both use the GMM
technique. Focusing on the full model (A) and estimates which are significant
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at the 10% level, the three decisiveness mechanisms size, gender, and employee
directors are fully consistent. For the information mechanisms, the network vari-
able is consistent, whereas the positive performance effect of CEO directors is no
longer significant. Under alignment, the loss of significance for Independence when
lagged firm performance variable is included supports the Hermalin and Weisbach
(1998) hypothesis that good performance makes boards less independent. That
is, the performance effect of independent boards is not driven by independence
per se, but by lagged performance and the CEO’s power to influence board com-
position. This feedback effect from the statistically significant past performance
supports the reverse causation due to contemporaneous performance in table 4.3.
Similarly, directors’ ownership becomes more significant, both regarding its linear
and quadratic terms. This is consistent with the finding by Palia (2001) that high
performance increases the probability that directors increase their shareholdings.
These results also show that compared to the basic model in table 4.2, past
performance has a role to play because it influences current performance directly
and also changes the relationship between current performance and the board
mechanisms. This pattern supports our early findings on reverse causation in
section 4.3.
4.5 Summary
Our empirical tests in chapter 4 have shown that independently of model richness
(full vs simplified), estimation method (GLS vs GMM) and model type (static vs
dynamic), the information access created by the network of multiple directorships
is always positively related to performance in a statistically significant way. In
contrast, more diversity produced by larger board size, more gender diversity, and
more employee directors are all negatively and significantly associated with per-
formance. As for interest alignment, outside ownership concentration never enters
the models in a significant way, whereas insider ownership does in the predicted
manner under GMM estimation. More independence goes along with lower per-
formance in the static models, but the relationship becomes insignificant when
past performance is included. Reverse causation between past performance and
current board design does not justify the use of dynamic as opposed to static mod-
els. Finally, our findings from models which explicitly consider reverse causation
and endogeneity do not invalidate the results from our basic model estimated with
GMM, as this method implicitly controls for such effects.
Chapter 5
Robustness
This chapter first analyzes the sensitivity of our findings in chapter 4 to using
differenced rather than time demeaned data to control for fixed effects. Second,
we explore the impact of operationalizing board independence and director infor-
mation network in alternative ways. Third, we investigate what happens when we
include employee directors in the proxies for independence, gender, and board size.
Finally, using the fixed effects model as the point of reference, we explore whether
our findings can be generalized to models which ignore the panel structure of the
data set.
5.1 A differenced model
An alternative method for removing the unobserved, individual firm effect is to
time difference the data in (4.2). Thus, the dependent variable is differenced as
∆Qit = Qit −Qi,t−1, and the independent variables are transformed in the same
manner.
Differencing the variables in (4.1) and also introducing the lagged, differenced
dependent variable as a new independent variable (see section 4.4) transforms the
static equation into a dynamic model:
∆Qt = Constant+α∆Qt−1+β∆(Governance mechanisms)t+γ∆(Controls)t+∆uit
(5.1)
The constant is now time differenced. Notice that, just as with the time-
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demeaning we have used up to now, the individual firm effect disappears through
the differencing. Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest using GMM to estimate (5.1).
The argument is that instruments may be constructed from the fact that lagged
explanatory variables in levels are orthogonal to the residuals at each level.1 An
advantage of this change model compared to a levels model is that differencing the
lagged performance produces a dynamic model with less reverse causation prob-
lems, as the change in performance is less likely to influence the change in board
design mechanisms. However, this procedure turns out to be unsuccessful in our
case, possibly because the differencing is not suitable for our data set. Because
board mechanisms are quite persistent over time, they may contain insufficient
variation in the differenced series. Another drawback of the Arellano-Bond proce-
dure is the large loss of observations due to the lagging.
Because of these problems, we estimate a modified Arellano-Bond model. We
first tried to follow the Arellano and Bond (1991) procedure and use instruments
from the set of lagged independent variables in each period. This approach was
unsuccessful, as the differencing and subsequent lagging of the dependent variable
and the instruments made us lose too many observations. Also, because the in-
struments were often linearly dependent, the estimates were unstable. Therefore,
we decided instead to choose instruments the way we did in section 4.4, i.e., by
using raw and differenced explanatory variables.
Table 5.1 shows the results of estimating (5.1). Just like in table 4.1, the full
specification is estimated as model (A), whereas (B)-(G) are partial versions. In
addition to the lagged performance difference and the control variable, a partial
model includes either one or two of the three sets of board design mechanisms.
1Specifically, Arellano and Bond (1991) assume that each explanatory variable lagged two
periods, xi,(t−2), is uncorrelated with the error term at time t. The first time this happens
is at t = 3, which constitutes the first moment and hence produces the first year of moment
conditions. In general, the moment condition for time period t is:
E
 
xij(t−2)
 
∆Qit −Constant − α∆Qi,(t−1) − βX
′
it

= 0
(
t = 3, . . . , T
j = 1, . . . ,K
Thus, GMM estimators may be developed that use all available lags in each period as instru-
ments for (5.1). Every explanatory variable produces (T − 2)(T − 1)/2 moment conditions, and
each explanatory variable may be used to construct instruments.
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Table 5.1 Dynamic relationships between firm performance and board design
mechanisms estimated in a modified Arellano and Bond (1991) approach and
GMM. Instruments are squared, differenced explanatory variables, including the
lagged, differenced Tobin’s Q. Each regression uses only instruments belonging to
the same class of explanatory variables.
Variable (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
Constant -0.092∗∗ -0.094∗∗ -0.099∗∗ -0.085∗∗ -0.099∗∗ -0.087∗∗ -0.092∗∗
Alignment
∆ Directors’ holdings 1.020∗ 1.018∗ 0.968∗ 1.055∗
∆ Directors’ holdings sqrd -1.068∗ -1.088∗ -1.040∗ -1.104∗
∆ Herfindahl index 0.084 0.128 0.142 0.076
∆ Independence -0.015 -0.012 -0.013 -0.013
Information
CEO director 0.032 0.034 0.029 0.036
∆ Exported CEO 0.022 0.027 0.023 0.026
∆ Imported CEO -0.219 -0.233 -0.214 -0.235
∆ Network 0.996∗∗ 0.920∗∗ 0.954∗∗ 0.959∗∗
Decisiveness
∆ Size -0.050∗ -0.032 -0.039 -0.044∗
∆ Gender 0.046 -0.065 0.016 -0.034
∆ Board age dispersion 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
∆ Employee directors -1.144∗∗ -1.106∗∗ -1.121∗∗ -1.132∗∗
Past performance
∆ Tobin’s Q lagged -0.248∗∗ -0.253∗∗ -0.244∗∗ -0.256∗∗ -0.244∗∗ -0.257∗∗ -0.247∗∗
Controls
∆ Firm size -0.027 -0.032∗ -0.027∗ -0.026 -0.031∗ -0.028∗ -0.024
∆ Risk -0.021 -0.014 -0.024 -0.012 -0.026 -0.011 -0.022
N 1051 1051 1057 1057 1051 1051 1057
J statistic 233.245 104.476 95.692 212.336 234.914 225.979 220.002
J ’s p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Over ID test 236.851 105.277 96.422 213.956 237.627 228.589 222.528
ID test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
The table shows the results for regressions where the dependent variable is the differenced Tobin’s Q,
which we measure as the market value of the firm over its book value. Except for the dummy variable
(CEO director), every independent variable is differenced. Differencing involves subtracting the value
at time t from the value at time t− 1. The full specification in expression (5.1) is estimated as model
(A), and models (B)-(G) are partial versions of (A). In addition to the control and the differenced,
lagged performance variable, a partial model includes either one or two of the three sets of board
design mechanisms as independent variables. Significant results at the 5% (10%) level are marked
with ∗∗ (∗).
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Sample size is reduced from 1510 in table 4.1 to 1051 firm-years in the full
specification (A). Compared to earlier estimates, the results in table 5.1 are dis-
appointing. Even though we recognize all the qualitative results for the board
mechanisms from earlier, except that gender, fewer coefficients are significant.
Moreover, the significant lagged performance now has a negative sign throughout.
This may suggest that differencing is unsuitable for this data set. As mentioned in
section 4.2, differencing instead of time-demeaning a rather persistent time series
may easily produce a time series with very low volatility. When this happens,
there are less significant results with differenced as opposed to time-demeaned
data. Furthermore, we notice that the statistics on overall model performance
is quite poor. Thus, we choose not to question our earlier results based on the
findings in table 5.1.
5.2 Empirical proxies
Every regression model in chapter 4 operationalizes the theoretical concepts in
the same way. However, table 3.1 specifies alternative ways of measuring several
theoretical concepts that we have not used yet. This section explores the robustness
of our findings to alternative ways of measuring the theoretical constructs of board
independence, director network, gender mix, and board size.
The independence measure defined in (2.1), which we developed from the Her-
malin and Weisbach (1998) logic, is based on the tenure of the CEO vs. the
tenure of non-CEO directors. As noted in section 2.1, however, some argue that
board independence is a matter of absolute rather than relative tenure, and that
independence decreases rather than increases as tenure grows (Carter and Lorsch,
2004). We test this competing hypothesis by alternatively operationalizing inde-
pendence by board tenure, CEO tenure, and chairman tenure, respectively. Under
the Carter-Lorsch hypothesis, the expected relationship to performance is negative
for board and chairman tenure.
The second alternative operationalization is for the information network vari-
able. Unlike our quite sophisticated proxy, every existing paper simply uses the
average number of outside directorships (Hallock, 1997; Fich and White, 2000).
Based on the arguments in section 2.2, we expect that the estimated coefficient
of this alternative measure will have the same sign as our proxy, but will be less
significant both economically and statistically.
46 CHAPTER 5. ROBUSTNESS
Table 5.2 The fixed effects model estimated with GMM under alternative empir-
ical proxies for board independence and director network. The regressions use the
same instrument set as in table 4.2, but with new variable definitions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Board CEO Chair BT No Model
tenure tenure tenure OD OD controls (A)
Alignment
Directors’ holdings 0.975∗ 0.911∗ 0.879∗ 0.903∗ 0.976∗ 0.716∗∗ 0.924∗
Directors’ holdings sqrd -0.782 -0.694 -0.658 -0.691 -0.781 -0.601 -0.712
Herfindahl index 0.180 0.197 0.203 0.179 0.180 0.127 0.192
Independence -0.038∗∗ -0.004 -0.010 -0.014∗∗ -0.050∗∗ -0.012∗ -0.011∗
Information
CEO director 0.090∗ 0.084∗ 0.088∗ 0.077 0.092∗ 0.071 0.081∗
Exported CEO dummy -0.030 -0.028 -0.029 -0.065∗∗ -0.066∗∗ -0.016 -0.030
Imported CEO -0.158 -0.055 -0.082 -0.341∗ -0.488∗∗ -0.032 -0.055
Network 1.327∗∗ 1.358∗∗ 1.371∗∗ 0.249∗∗ 0.276∗∗ 1.457∗∗ 1.385∗∗
Decisiveness
Size -0.051∗∗ -0.048∗∗ -0.047∗∗ -0.036∗∗ -0.036∗∗ -0.072∗∗ -0.053∗∗
Gender dummy -0.600∗∗ -0.643∗∗ -0.622∗∗ -0.696∗∗ -0.636∗∗ -0.586∗∗ -0.626∗∗
Board age dispersion -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.000
Employee directors -0.974∗∗ -1.002∗∗ -1.027∗∗ -0.927∗∗ -0.800∗∗ -1.164∗∗ -1.061∗∗
Controls
Firm size -0.022 -0.030∗ -0.028 -0.032∗ -0.013 -0.036∗∗
Risk 0.006 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.009 -0.002
N 1502 1502 1502 1502 1502 1612 1502
J statistic 30.677 32.942 31.296 32.297 26.243 30.385 34.322
J ’s p-value 0.533 0.421 0.451 0.402 0.710 0.297 0.357
Over ID test 27.988 28.298 27.598 24.845 27.636 15.849 26.950
ID test p-value 0.670 0.655 0.689 0.812 0.687 0.956 0.720
The table shows the results of using alternative empirical proxies for board independence in models
(1)-(3), director network in model (4), and a combination of the two in model (5). Model (6) is our
base-case model (G) from table 4.1 with Firm size and Risk removed. ’OD’ is the average number of
outside directorships held by the board members, and ’BT’ is the board tenure proxy from model (1).
Model (7) is model (A) from table 4.1. Significant results at the 5% (10%) level are marked with ∗∗
(∗).
Table 5.2 shows the results of re-estimating the fixed effects model (4.1) under
alternative proxies for independence (models (1)-(3)), director network (model
(4)) and for one combination of the two (model (5)). Model (6) is our full model
(A) from table 4.2, except that we remove the control variables to check if they
influence the results for the board mechanisms. Model (7) is the full model (A)
from table 4.2.
The estimates for model (6) are very close to those obtained in table 4.2.
Thus, the control variable has no material effect on the estimated relationship
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between board design mechanisms and performance. This also illustrates how the
fixed effects model removes firm heterogeneity, and thereby makes control variables
relatively less important.
Comparing the estimates of the base-case full model in table 4.2 to those using
alternative empirical proxies in models (1)-(5), the first impression is that the
board mechanisms influencing information access and decisiveness are very robust
to alternative operationalizations. The estimated sign, the economic significance,
and the statistical significance are very close across the models.
Under the alignment mechanisms, the coefficient estimates and the significance
of the relationship between performance and ownership is insensitive to how board
independence and director network are operationalized. This is not always the case
for the interaction between performance and independence when independence is
defined in terms of absolute rather than relative tenure (models (1)-(3)). Us-
ing CEO tenure or chairman tenure (models (2) and (3)), the estimated sign of
the independence variable is no longer significant. In model (1), however, longer
board tenure is associated with weaker performance in a significant way. This is
consistent with the Carter and Lorsch (2004) hypothesis that less independence
operationalized as longer board tenure produces lower performance. Thus, direc-
tors should not sit too long on the board. In our base case model, however, which
is based on the Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) logic that independence is driven
by relative and not absolute tenure, longer board tenure makes independence grow
rather than decline. Therefore, given our earlier result that performance falls as
independence grows, it is not surprising to find the opposite under the Carter and
Lorsch (2004) definition. This shows that the theoretical rationale and the empir-
ical operationalization of board independence are crucial. We prefer the Hermalin
and Weisbach (1998) definition, both due to its stronger theoretical backing and
because our results using this definition are consistent with most existing evidence.
Therefore, we maintain that according to our analysis, board independence and
firm performance are inversely associated.
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Table 5.3 The fixed effects model and GMM estimation under alternative oper-
ationalizations of independence, board size, and gender. The instrument set is as
in table 4.2, except for new variable definitions.
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Alignment
Directors’ holdings 0.777 0.989∗ 0.691 0.924∗
Directors’ holdings sqrd -0.734 -0.806 -0.795 -0.712
Herfindahl index 0.254∗∗ 0.287∗∗ 0.189 0.192
Independence -0.014∗∗ -0.012∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.011∗
Information
CEO director 0.061 0.102∗∗ 0.071 0.081∗
Exported CEO -0.016 -0.025 -0.021 -0.030
Imported CEO -0.033 -0.015 -0.068 -0.055
Network 1.300∗∗ 1.388∗∗ 1.330∗∗ 1.385∗∗
Decisiveness
Size -0.031∗∗ -0.041∗∗ -0.019 -0.053∗∗
Gender -0.198 -0.147 -0.472∗ -0.626∗∗
Board age dispersion 0.002 -0.003 0.001 0.000
Employee directors -0.581∗∗ -0.648∗ -0.716∗∗ -1.061∗∗
Controls
Firm size -0.035∗ -0.043∗∗ -0.024 -0.035∗ -0.036∗∗
Risk 0.019 0.037 0.002 0.021 -0.002
N 1498 1498 1511 1498 1502
J statistic 40.801 33.200 20.075 39.404 34.322
J ’s p-value 0.137 0.120 0.453 0.018 0.357
Over ID test 29.583 27.701 23.198 20.583 26.950
ID test p-value 0.589 0.273 0.279 0.422 0.720
Including employee directors in the definition of board size, gender, and independence, the table
shows estimates of five regression models where the dependent variable is the time demeaned Tobin’s
Q, which we measure as the market value of the firm over its book value. Model (E) reproduces the
results from the full model in table 4.2. Model (A) is the full model when Employee directors are
included in the measures of Independence, Size, and Gender. Partial versions of (A) are shown in
(B)-(D). Besides the control variables, a partial model includes one or two of the three sets of board
design mechanisms (alignment, information, and decisiveness). For each firm and each variable, time
demeaning involves subtracting a given year’s observation from the firm’s overall mean. Significant
results at the 5% (10%) level are marked with ∗∗ (∗).
Models (4) and (5) use the average number of outside directorships to proxy
for the information network. The relationship between performance and the in-
formation network is positive and significant, but is much smaller economically
than under our more sophisticated information centrality measure used in model
(7). This is as expected. Whereas the outside directorship measure only counts
all outside directorships held, our network proxy avoids double counting, includes
indirect network effects, and recognizes the relative position of each firm in the
network.
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We pointed out in section 2.3 that if we are concerned with the performance
effect of board size or gender diversity, it seems irrelevant whether or not the direc-
tors are elected by shareholders or employees. Due to potential multicollinearity,
however, we have so far removed employee directors from the gender and board
size variables. To explore the effect of lifting this restriction, we reestimate the
full model from table 4.2 in table 5.3, letting size and gender reflect the full board
rather than only those elected by stockholders. Moreover, we include employee
directors in our independence measure.
All estimated signs are maintained in the table except for the insignificant board
age dispersion under model (C) and the insignificant risk in (A)-(D). Focusing on
the two full models (A) and (E), the coefficients for the alignment mechanisms
change somewhat under the new measures. Ownership concentration becomes sig-
nificant, insider holdings are not significant anymore, and independence is slightly
more negative and more significant. While the CEO director variable becomes
insignificant under information mechanisms, the coefficient for gender as a deci-
siveness mechanism is reduced by two thirds and is insignificant. Notice also that
the revised definition of these three variables increases the significant performance
effect of one of them (independence) and maintains the significance of another
(size). For the third variable (gender), however, the association to performance is
no longer significant.
Overall, these results increase our confidence in models where employee direc-
tors are ignored in the definition of independence, board size, and gender.
5.3 The pooled sample
To explore whether panel data estimation is required in our setting, we estimate
(4.1) with the pooled sample using OLS. Unlike panel data methods, this approach
ignores both individual effects and time effects, assuming that the error term is
identical across all firms and time periods. In order to compensate for the ignored
consideration of heterogeneity, researchers often use a battery of control variables.
The idea is that good control variables reduce the firm-specific background noise,
making it easier to estimate the robust relationship between the variables of in-
terest. If this approach is successful, we would also expect control variables to be
more significant than in panel data models. Also, unlike panel data methods, the
OLS approach allows for time invariant control variables in the regressions.
Table 5.4 shows the results of the estimation, where we have added the firm’s
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Table 5.4 Firm performance explained by board design mechanisms, using the
pooled sample and OLS estimation.
Variable (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
Constant 1.855∗∗ 1.851∗∗ 1.612∗∗ 2.117∗∗ 1.610∗∗ 2..094∗∗ 1.879∗∗
Alignment
Directors’ holdings 1.896∗∗ 1.977∗∗ 1.900∗∗ 1.953∗∗
Directors’ holdings sqrd -1.433∗∗ -1.520∗∗ -1.433∗∗ -1.498∗∗
Herfindahl index -0.635∗∗ -0.734∗∗ -0.659∗∗ -0.710∗∗
Independence 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002
Information
CEO director -0.006 -0.025 -0.036 0.002
Exported CEO -0.069∗ -0.060∗ -0.073∗∗ -0.054
Imported CEO -0.080 -0.054 -0.075 -0.086
Network 2.002∗∗ 2.234∗∗ 1.998∗∗ 2.198∗∗
Decisiveness
Size -0.029 -0.013 -0.022 -0.021
Gender -0.224 -0.658∗∗ -0.311 -0.540∗
Board age dispersion -0.011 -0.017∗∗ -0.013 -0.016∗
Employee directors 0.309∗ 0.335∗ 0.345∗∗ 0.303∗
Controls
Industry 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0..000∗∗ 0.000∗∗
Firm size -0.098∗∗ -0.087∗∗ -0.102∗∗ -0.095∗∗ -0.096∗∗ -0.091∗∗ -0.104∗∗
Risk 0.236∗∗ 0.260∗∗ 0.248∗∗ 0.270∗∗ 0.241∗∗ 0.258∗∗ 0.239∗∗
N 1510 1510 1520 1520 1510 1510 1520
R2 0.184 0.162 0.150 0.137 0.178 0.168 0.156
F (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Breusch-Pagan 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
The table shows estimates of OLS regression models on the pooled smaple where the dependent
variable is Tobin’s Q, which we measure as the market value of the firm over its book value. The full
specification in expression equation (4.1) is estimated as model (A), and models (B)-(G) are partial
versions of (A). Besides the control variables, a partial model includes either one or two of the three
sets of board design mechanisms (alignment, information, and decisiveness). Significant results at the
5% (10%) level are marked with ∗∗ (∗).
industry as a control variable. We compare the findings with those under GLS in
table 4.1, since the OLS methodology is closer to GLS than to GMM. As the results
are quite consistent across models within each table, we compare the estimates of
the full pooled sample model (A) in table 5.4 to those of the full fixed effects model
(A) in table 4.1.
There are some noticeable differences. First, unlike the panel data model, the
pooled model reproduces the classic result in the ownership structure literature of
a positive and quadratic relationship between insider holdings and corporate per-
formance (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Gugler, 2001). Also, outside ownership
concentration is now inversely related to performance in a significant way. Second,
5.4. SUMMARY 51
the negative exported CEO effect becomes significant, and the significant coeffi-
cient of the network effect is smaller. Third, only employee directors is significant
among the decisiveness mechanisms. However, its sign is reversed, and the sig-
nificance weakens. Fourth, the importance of the control variables has increased
considerably. Finally, the R2 values are much smaller with pooled data.
These findings show very clearly that unless we can ignore the panel data
structure in our data set, the pooled model is seriously misspecified. Table 5.5
clarifies this issue by analyzing the error terms of the OLS model.
Table 5.5 Individual effects and time effects in the error term in an OLS regression
of model (4.1) under the pooled sample.
Sum of Mean
Source squares Degrees square F -statistic p-value
Individual 899.576 259 3.473 7.373 0.000
Time 67.690 13 5.207 11.054 0.000
Joint 995.755 272 3.661 7.772 0.000
Error 591.184 1255 0.471
Total 1586.939 1527
The table shows the results for an analysis of variance (ANOVA) test of the null hypothesis that the
mean error term from the OLS estimation is identical across individual companies, across time, or
both. The total variance of the OLS error term is decomposed in the Sum of squares column. These
figures are used to construct the F-statistics, which reflect the differences between the common mean
the mean error in each source of variation. The sample size is 1527.
The ANOVA test splits the total variance of the OLS error term into individ-
ual, time, and random components. The table shows that panel effects are very
prevalent in our data. Also, the firm-specific component is very large relative to
the firm-independent time component. Both characteristics show that the pooling
approach is infeasible and should be replaced by a methodology that recognizes
the panel structure, such as the model in section 4.2.
5.4 Summary
The robustness tests in this chapter have shown that due to the panel nature of our
data set, estimation models which ignore this property and instead rely on pooled
data are grossly misspecified. Among the alternative panel data approaches, we
find that individual firm effects are better taken care of by time demeaning the
variables rather than by differencing them. As for empirical proxies for theoret-
ical concepts, alternative ways of operationalizing information network, gender
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diversity, and board size have no fundamental effect on the interaction between
performance and board composition. When we measure independence by board
tenure (longer tenure reflects less independence) rather than the relative tenure of
the directors vs the CEO (longer tenure reflects more independence, given constant
CEO tenure), performance is again negatively associated with tenure. This is as
expected from the two independence definitions. Because we think the relative
tenure definition based on Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) has stronger theoretical
backing and is more consistent with existing evidence, we maintain that board
independence and firm performance are inversely associated in our sample firms.
Chapter 6
Summary and conclusions
The basic question we ask in this study is how the composition of the board
influences the firm’s ability to create economic value. Our approach differs from
existing ones by exploring board design in a new regulatory environment, analyzing
a wider set of board design mechanisms including gender diversity and employee
directors, using time-series data rather than a single-period cross-section, measur-
ing board independence and directors’ information network in a novel way, and by
showing how conclusions change if we ignore the multi-period nature of the data
and replace our panel data methods by the more common pooled sample and OLS
estimation techniques.
Studying all non-financial firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange over the
period 1989-2002, we find that both inside and outside ownership concentration
are low and are complements rather than substitutes. This means ownership is
often separated from control, such that potential agency costs are high. This set-
ting makes the board’s monitoring function critical, particularly in firms where
low inside ownership produces both weak value maximization incentives for man-
agement and low monitoring incentives for directors. The board’s independence
of the CEO is medium in the Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) sense, as the CEO
and the average director have roughly the same tenure.
The CEO is a director in the firm he runs in less than one third of the cases, but
those who are also sit more often on other boards. Nevertheless, the typical CEO
does not play the double roles of being both a monitor and the monitored. Our
director network measure, which picks up both the direct and indirect effects of
holding multiple board seats, shows that firms differ widely in their director-driven
access to information from other boards.
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If homogeneity fosters decisiveness, the remarkably small size and the low gen-
der diversity in our sample firms’ boards suggest that they are effective decision-
making units. In contrast, director age produces much more diversity. The typical
director is forty seven years old, average age per board varies by almost fifty years
across the sample, and there are often large age differences within the board. Less
than half the firms have employee directors, which is mandated when the firm
employs more than 200 people. Over the sample period, the CEO is gradually
less often a director, female directors become much more common, and the use
of employee directors declines. Thus, although each separate component changes
over time, the dynamics of overall board diversity is unclear.
We test the empirical relationship between board design and economic per-
formance with both static and dynamic panel data models, using GLS and par-
ticularly GMM estimation techniques. Regardless of model type and estimation
method, we find that performance is significantly higher in firms where the di-
rectors sit on several boards. Thus, multiple directorships produce information
networks whose value more than offsets the cost of having busy, overstretched di-
rectors. In contrast, higher board diversity produced by larger board size, stronger
gender mix, and more employee directors are all negatively and often significantly
related to performance. This may happen because more diversity reduces the
board’s effectiveness as a decision-making unit. In addition, the negative asso-
ciation between market value and the use of employee directors may reflect a
fundamental conflict of interest between owners and employees.
Whereas outside ownership concentration is very seldom a significant deter-
minant of firm performance, insider ownership often is. Thus, monitoring by
non-director owners is an ineffective disciplining device, whereas directors with
ownership stakes produce valuable disciplining and support functions. Correspond-
ingly, investors benefit if managers have ownership-driven incentives to maximize
market value. Moreover, economic performance improves when the directors are
dependent rather than independent of the CEO. Thus, the longer the directors’
arm’s length distance to the CEO, the less value they produce. This conclusion
is strengthened by our finding that boards perform better when the CEO is a
member.
Causation does not just run both from board design mechanisms to perfor-
mance, but also from performance to board design. Moreover, mechanisms are
endogenous because they jointly determine each other. Although neither reverse
causation nor mechanism endogeneity invalidates our conclusions, it sometimes
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reduces our ability to separate causes from effects in board design, which is a gen-
eral problem in corporate governance research. Finally, our robustness tests show
that estimation models which ignore the panel structure of the data are grossly
misspecified. Alternative ways of measuring information network, gender diver-
sity, and board size have only moderate effects on the estimated interaction board
composition and economic performance.
A recent survey concludes that the formal board literature is surprisingly thin,
given the wide attention paid in public policy debates to this core component of a
firm’s corporate governance system (Becht et al., 2002). Correspondingly, research
on the relationship between board composition and economic performance is still
in its infancy. This paper tries to improve on this situation by searching for
the characteristics of value-creating boards, using a comprehensive and rigorous
empirical framework. Our findings suggest that designers of value-creating boards
should encourage insider stock ownership, ensure the CEO is a member even if it
reduces independence, hire directors with professional business competence rather
than arms-length monitoring capacity, recognize the network value of directors
with multiple seats rather than worry about potential overstretching, and construct
boards that are homogeneous rather than diverse.
Some of these conclusions are politically incorrect, run counter to key recom-
mendations of most countries’ corporate governance codes, and pull board design
into opposite directions than those implied by conventional wisdom. We think this
may reflect a situation where practical board design has been shaped by practition-
ers and regulators based on their limited personal experience, political agendas,
and recently also by a concern with scandal prevention rather than firm value
maximization. Our findings support the claim that much more academic research
is needed in order to ensure a well-founded economic rationale for the regulation
of board design.
Appendix A
Definitions
Table A.1: Definition of variables used in the empirical analysis
Variable Definition
Alignment
Insider ownership Fraction of equity owned by the firm’s officers
CEO holdings Fraction of equity owned by the firm’s CEO
Directors’ holdings Fraction of equity owned by the board of directors
Herfindahl index A measure of the concentration of ownership, defined as the
sum of the squares of the shares of each individual owner di-
vided by the squared sum of individual shares
Three largest own-
ers
Fraction of equity owned by the firm’s three largest owners
Largest outsider Fraction of equity owned by largest non-director
CEO tenure The tenure of the CEO
Board tenure The average tenure of the board of directors, employee direc-
tors excluded
Chair tenure The chairman’s tenure
Independence The board’s Independence, that is, the average tenure of the
board minus the tenure of the CEO
Information
CEO director Dummy variable which is 1 if the CEO is a member of the
board of his company and zero otherwise
Exported CEO The number of board directorships in other companies held by
the CEO
Imported CEO The proportion of CEOs from other companies on the board
Outside director-
ships
Average number of outside directorships per board member
Network Information centrality, (defined in the text)
continued on next page
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Table A.1: continued
Variable Definition
Decisiveness
Size Board size measured as the number of directors
Size1 Board size, exclusive of employee directors
Gender The proportion of female directors on the board
Gender1 The proportion of female directors in boards without employee
directors
Gender2 The proportion of female directors in boards with employee
directors
Gender3 The proportion of female directors on the board, excluding the
employee directors
Gender4 The proportion of female directors among employee directors,
when employee directors are represented
Board age The average age of the board
CEO age The CEO’s age
Board age disper-
sion
The standard deviation of board age
Employee directors The number of employee directors
Fraction employee
directors
The number of employee directors divided by the total number
of directors (Size)
Employee directors
dummy
Dummy variable which is 1 if employees’ representatives are
on the board and zero otherwise
Controls
Firm size The natural logarithm of accounting income
Industry GICS industry classification code
Risk The firm’s equity beta, estimated as the standardized covari-
ance with the Oslo Stock Exchange Index (OBX), using two
years of daily returns
Performance
Q Tobin’s Q; measured as market value divided by book value of
assets
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